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THE ALLURE OF A LURE: PROPOSED FEDERAL 
LAND USE RESTRICTION EASEMENTS IN 
REMEDIATION OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 
Lauri DeBrie Thanheiser* 
INTRODUCTION 
Proposed amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),1 introduced in 
the House of Representatives on October 18, 1995, proposed to amend 
Section 104 by providing for acquisition of hazardous substance ease-
ments by the President.2 This proposed reauthorization bill provided 
* B.s. Col. State 1980; J.D. S. Texas Coll. of Law, 1992; LL.M. Univ. of Houston L.C., 1996. 
The author is an associate at the firm of Bayko, Gibson, Carnegie, Hagen, Schoonmaker & 
Meyer. This thesis was developed as a curriculum requirement towards an LL.M. in Energy, 
Environmental and Natural Resources Law at the University of Houston Law Center. 
1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994), as amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986 (SARA). This article will use the term CERCLA, or its popular name "Super-
fund" to mean the original Act and the Act as amended by SARA. SARA will be used to refer 
only to specific provisions of the amendment. 
2 H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 113 (1995). Section 113, Hazardous Substance Property 
Use, provides: 
Section 104 (42 U.S.C. § 9604) is amended by adding at the end the following: 
(k) HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE PROPERTY USE.-
(1) AUTHORITY OF PRESIDENT TO ACQUIRE EASEMENTs.-In order to prevent expo-
sure to, reduce the likelihood of, or otherwise respond to a release or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance, the President may acquire, at fair market value, or 
for other consideration as agreed to by the parties, a hazardous substance easement 
which restricts, limits, or controls the use of land, water, or other natural resources, 
including specifying permissible or impermissible uses of land, prohibiting specified 
activities upon property, prohibiting the drilling of wells or use of ground water, or 
restricting the use of surface water. 
(2) USE OF EABEMENTS.-A hazardous substance easement and notice of a property 
use restriction under this subsection may be used wherever institutional controls have 
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been selected as a component of a removal or remedial action in accordance with this 
Act and the National Contingency Plan. Such easements and notices shall not be used 
in cases in which institutional controls are not relied upon in a removal or remedial 
action. Whenever such controls are selected as a component of a removal or remedial 
action, the President shall ensure that the terms of the controls and, as appropriate, 
the easement are specified in all appropriate decision documents, enforcement orders, 
and public information regarding the site. 
(3) PERSONS SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS.-A hazardous substance easement shall be 
enforceable for 20 years and may be renewed for additional 20-year periods (unless 
terminated and released as provided for in this section) against any owner of the 
affected property and all persons who subsequently acquire interest in the property 
or rights to use the property, including lessees, licensees, and any other person with 
an interest in the property, without respect to privity or lack of privity of estate or 
contract, lack of benefit running to any other property, assignment of the easement to 
another party, or any other circumstance which might otherwise affect the enforceabil-
ity of easements or similar deed restrictions under the laws of the State. The easement 
shall be binding upon holders of any other interests in the property regardless of 
whether such interests are recorded or whether they were recorded prior or sub-
sequent to the easement, and shall remain in effect notwithstanding any foreclosure 
or other assertion of such interests. 
(4) CONTENTS OF EASEMENTS.-A hazardous substance easement shall contain, at a 
minimum-
(A) a legal description of the property affected; 
(B) the name or names of any current owner or owners of the property as reflected 
in public land records; 
(C) a description of the release or threatened release; and 
(D) a statement as to the nature of the restriction, limitation, or control created by 
the easement. 
(5) USE RESTRICTION NOTICE.-Whenever the President acquires a hazardous sub-
stance easement or assigns a hazardous substance easement to another party, the 
President shall record a notice of property use restriction in the public land records 
for the jurisdiction in which the affected property is located. Such a notice shall specify 
restrictions, limitations, or controls on the use of land, water, or other natural resources 
provided for in the hazardous substance easement. 
(6) FILING OF NOTIcE.-Wherever recording in the public land records is required 
under this subsection, the President shall file the notice or other instrument in the 
appropriate office within the State (or governmental subdivision) in which the affected 
property is located, as designated by State law. If the State has not by law designated 
one office for the recording of interests in real property or claims or rights burdening 
real property, the document or notice shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the 
United States district court for the district in which the affected property is located. 
(7) METHODS OF ACQUIRING EASEMENTS.-The President may acquire a hazardous 
substance easement by purchase or other agreement, by condemnation, or by any 
other means permitted by law. Compensation for such easement shall be at fair market 
value, or for other consideration as agreed to by the parties, for the interest acquired. 
The direct cost of such easements, ensuring adequate public notice of such easements, 
and otherwise tracking and maintaining the protections afforded by the easements 
shall be considered response costs which are recoverable under this Act. 
(8) ASSIGNMENT OF EASEMENTS TO PARTIES OTHER THAN THE PRESIDENT.-
(A) AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN.-The President may assign an easement acquired 
under this subsection to a State or other governmental entity that has the capability 
of effectively enforcing the easement over the period of time necessary to achieve the 
purposes of the easement. In the case of any assignment, the easement shall be fully 
enforceable by the assignee. Any assignment of such an easement by the President 
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that the President could acquire an easement through response or 
remedial actions as a type of institutional contro1.3 Through negoti-
may be made by following the same procedures as are used for the transfer of an 
interest in real property to a State under Section 104(j). 
(B) EFFECT OF ASSIGNMENT.-Any interest in property granted to a State or 
other governmental entity which restricts, limits, or controls the use of land, water, or 
other natural resources in order to prevent exposure to, reduce the likelihood of, or 
otherwise respond to, a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance, and 
which is expressly designated in writing as a hazardous substance easement within the 
meaning of this paragraph, shall create the same rights, have the same legal effect, 
and be enforceable in the same manner as a hazardous substance easement held by the 
President regardless of whether the interest in property is otherwise denominated as 
an easement, covenant, or any other form of property right. 
(9) PUBLIC NOTICE.-Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
subsection, the President shall issue regulations regarding the procedures to be used 
for public notice of proposed property use restrictions. Such regulations shall ensure 
that before acquiring a hazardous substance easement, and before recording any notice 
of such easement, the President will give notice and an opportunity to comment to the 
owner of the affected property, all other persons with recorded interests in the prop-
erty, any lessees or other authorized occupants of the property known to the President, 
the State and any municipalities in which the property is located, any relevant com-
munity assistance group established under Section 117, the affected community, and 
the general public. 
(10) TERMINATION OF EASEMENTS.-An easement acquired under this subsection 
shall remain in force until it expires by its terms or until the holder of the easement 
executes and records a termination and release in accordance with the terms of the 
easement and approved by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
or the relevant assignee. Such termination shall be recorded in the same manner as 
the easement. 
(11) ENFORCEMENT.-
(A) EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS.-Violation of any restriction, limitation, or control 
imposed under a hazardous substance easement shall have the same effect as failure 
to comply with an order issued under Section 106 and relief may be sought either in 
enforcement actions under Section 106(b)(1), Section 120(g), or Section 127(e) or in 
citizens suits under Section 310. No citizens suit under Section 310 to enforce such a 
notice may be commenced if the holder of the easement has commenced and is dili-
gently prosecuting an action in court to enforce the easement. 
(B) ENFORCEMENT ACTIONs.-The President may take appropriate enforcement 
actions to ensure compliance with the terms of the easement whenever the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency determines that the terms set forth in 
the easement are being violated. If the easement has been assigned to a party other 
than the President and that party has not taken appropriate enforcement actions, the 
President may notify the assignee of the violation. If the party does not take appro-
priate enforcement actions within 30 days of such notification, or sooner in the case of 
an imminent hazard, the President may initiate such enforcement actions. 
(12) ApPLICABILITY OF OTHER PROVISIONS.-Holding a hazardous substance ease-
ment shall not subject either the holder thereof or the owner of the affected property 
to liability under Section 107. Any such easement acquired by the President shall not 
be subject to the requirements of Section 104(j) or 120(h). 
3Id. § 113(k)(2). Institutional controls are used to restrict access to a site or assure the 
effectiveness of a remedy, and may include deed restrictions or restrictive easements. See infra 
Section II. 
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ated consent agreements with property owners or purchasers, the 
easement would have been available for use in a Brownfields redevel-
opment project.4 
Easements have traditionally been used to provide access or oth-
erwise allow specific conduct by the easement holder. Easements are 
more frequently being used as a means of conveying development 
rights associated with property; these negative easements may be 
known as conservation or preservation easements. The term land use 
restriction easement and its acronym, LURE, applies to federal land 
use restriction easements authorized under various federal statutes.5 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) al-
ready has statutory authority under Section 104(e) of CERCLA to 
enter contaminated property, or adjacent lands, to carry out the re-
medial purposes of CERCLA.6 Existing Section l04G)7 grants EPA 
broad authority to acquire property by purchase or condemnation for 
longer term access and remediation purposes.8 Unlike these other 
provisions, the hazardous substance easement proposed at Section 
l04(k) was not designed simply to provide access. Rather, Section 
4 "EPA defines brownfields as 'abandoned, idled or underused industrial and commercial 
facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental 
contamination.'" See PETER F. GUERRERO, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, SUPER-
FUND-BARRIERS TO BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT, GAOIRCED-96-125 (June 1996) (report 
to Congressional requestors). 
5 See Karen A. Jordan, Perpetual Conservation: Accomplishing the Goal Through Preemptive 
Federal Easement Programs, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 406 & n.23 (1993). 
6 Congress amended Section 104(e) through SARA to respond to a United States Court of 
Appeals decision which held that CERCLA as originally enacted did not grant statutory 
authority to EPA to enter without consent. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883, 
889-91 (7th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text. 
742 U.S.C. § 96040) (1994). The Section states: 
0) Acquisition of property. 
(1) Authority. The President is authorized to acquire, by purchase, lease, condemna-
tion, donation, or otherwise, any real property or any interest in real property that the 
President in his discretion determines is needed to conduct a remedial action under 
this chapter. There shall be no cause of action to compel the President to acquire any 
interest in real property under this chapter. 
(2) State assurance. The President may use the authority of paragraph (1) for a 
remedial action only if, before an interest in real estate is acquired under this subsec-
tion, the State in which the interest to be acquired is located assures the President, 
through a contract or cooperative agreement or otherwise, that the State will accept 
transfer of the interest following completion of the remedial action. 
(3) Exemption. No Federal, State, or local government agency shall be liable under 
this chapter solely as a result of acquiring an interest in real estate under this subsec-
tion. 
8 United States v. Hardage, 58 F.3d 569, 577 n.7 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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104(k) was a direct attempt by the federal government to regulate 
land use by purchase. 
Parcel by parcel, community by community, the federal government 
would be allowed to acquire a partial fee in industrial, commercial, or 
residential property that was either a Superfund site, a site adjacent 
to a Superfund site, a site to which contaminants may have migrated 
through the soil or surface or groundwater, or any contaminated site.9 
EPA would determine acceptable future uses of the property and 
generally engage in land use planning. Interests retained by the 
federal government would be subject to the property power under 
Article IV of the United States Constitution, arguably giving the 
federal government a superior right to regulate with respect to the 
land.lO Even without the property power, the broad public purpose of 
Section 104(k) would accomplish the same result.n 
This federal land acquisition initiative continues the efforts begun 
through various farm programs and conservation and preservation 
programs pursuant to which the federal government may acquire 
interests in farmland, scenic areas, forests, historic buildings, wet-
lands, and other areas deemed worthy of national protection. But 
unlike acquisition of easements by the federal government for these 
conservation purposes, as well as the environmental remediation pur-
poses of Superfund, acquisition of easements for land-use planning 
purposes is not a valid public purpose. 
Proposed Section 104(k) would have created a federal scheme of 
land-use regulation that would not only preempt inconsistent state 
property laws but also would create a federal property interest. While 
the use of servitudes typically substitutes private arrangements for 
governmental intervention, the use of servitudes by the federal gov-
ernment as part of a regulatory scheme increases federal control of 
land and replaces state law policy choices with federal ones. At its 
extreme, Section 104(k) gives the federal government an interest in 
property that begins to eliminate the sovereign power of the states 
altogether. I will argue that this is not only unwise, but unconstitutional. 
In particular, the broad public purpose associated with federal in-
volvement effects a change in the nature of property rights and 
modifies common law rights and remedies. The provision for fed-
9 The use of Section 104(k) to acquire easements is related to the use of institutional controls. 
This section would apply not only to Superfund cleanups but also to redevelopment efforts under 
the Brownfields Initiative. See infra Section II.C. The authorization is broad enough to apply 
to the cleanup of any spill supportable under CERCLA. 
10 See infra Section III.C. 
11 See infra Section III. 
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eral hazardous substance easements appeared for the first time in a 
reauthorization bill introduced in the 103d Congress.12 Although Su-
perfund also was not reauthorized by the 104th Congress, the provi-
sion is likely to appear again in this or another form.13 Therefore, this 
paper will use H.R. 2500 and proposed Section 104(k) for illustrative 
purposes to show how the nature of property interests would be 
affected by attaching a broad public purpose to such an easement. In 
fact, the same result is being attained-without requiring a transfer 
of a property interest-through recent initiatives to increase public 
participation. This theme of increased public participation appears in 
connection with not only remedial actions,14 but also in environmental 
permitting.15 Further, courts have denied or withdrawn state authori-
zation to administer federal environmental programs on the basis that 
state standing laws are not sufficiently "consistent" with Article III 
standing under federallaw.16 
Section II of this article will review EPA's need for access to con-
taminated property and adjacent lands, and examine the use of insti-
tutional controls to implement remedial actions under Superfund as 
well as in redevelopment. Section III will look at easements and their 
acquisition in the context of environmental federalism, and the di-
12 See H.R. Res. 582, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). 
1:3 The 104th session of Congress closed without reauthorizing Superfund. Chairman Oxley, 
who sponsored H.R. 2500, announced repeatedly during negotiations that the House Commerce 
Committee would consider Brownfields separately. A separate Brownfields bill was introduced 
in the Senate on August 2, 1996, and was referred to the Environment and Public Works 
Committee. There were hearings on Capitol Hill on September 16, 1996, and an EPA-sponsored 
conference on Brownfields in Pittsburgh beginning September 20. EPA is moving forward with 
its Brownfields Initiative through pilot programs, negotiation of state agreements, and related 
proposals. A HUD appropriations bill signed September 26, 1996, included funding for 
Brownfields redevelopment but no legislative provisions. 
14 EPA has undertaken several recent administrative initiatives under the Superfund pro-
gram, including a CERCLA Land Use Directive, see infra Section ILB, and a community-based 
remedy selection pilot program. See Corrective Action for Releases From Solid Waste Manage-
ment Units at Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,432, 19,440 (1996) 
(Advance notice of rulemaking proposed May 1, 1996). These administrative reforms would 
apply to corrective actions under RCRA as well as to Superfund cleanups. See id. at 19,439. 
15 See "Notice of Availability of Permits Concept Paper on Environmental Permitting and 
Task Force Recommendation," 61 Fed. Reg. 41,252, 41,252-56 (1996) (describing public perform-
ance-based permitting and defining "stakeholder" as all groups interested in environmental 
permitting, including environmental, community and environmental justice groups, regulated 
entities, and state, tribal and local permitting agencies). 
16 See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 883 (4th Cir. 1996) (disapproving Virginia's program 
for issuing air pollution permits under Title V based on differences in judicial review of permit-
ting decisions under state law). Under Virginia law, a challenger must show a pecuniary and 
substantial interest in order to have standing to review the permit decision, a higher standard 
than that of Article III standing under federal law. See infra Section IILC. 
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lemma created when environmental regulation comes into tension 
with land-use regulation and federal laws conflict with state laws. 
Section IV considers the "Madisonian" dilemma of Section 104(k) in 
more detail, examining recent Supreme Court decisions construing 
the federal government's power under the Commerce Clause and the 
Spending Clause, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, and the 
limitations of the Tenth Amendment on federal action. I conclude that, 
although CERCLA's remediation purposes represent a valid exercise 
of the commerce power, Section 104(k) is not a legitimate use of the 
federal commerce power and, in contrast to Section 104(j) , is not 
merely incidental to the nationwide regulatory program. In effect, 
Section 104(k) would commandeer the state legislative process by 
allowing the federal government to regulate local land use by pur-
chase in violation of the Tenth Amendment's reservation of power to 
the states. For this reason, Section 104(k)'s land-use planning purpose 
also is not a valid public purpose for exercise of the federal govern-
ment's power of eminent domain. 
II. CERCLA RESPONSES AND LAND USE IMPLICATIONS 
CERCLA authorized the President to respond to any actual or 
threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment 
which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public 
health or welfare.17 CERCLA delegated the primary authority for 
carrying out its objectives to the EPA.ls A "response" under CER-
CLA may be either a removaP9 or a remedial action,2° including re-
17 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1994). 
18 See Exec. Order No. 12,580,52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615. 
19 "Remove" or "removal" under Section 101(23) is defined as: 
[Tlhe cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment; such 
actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous 
substances into the environment; such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, 
and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances; the disposal of 
removed material; or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, 
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare of the United States or 
to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. 
The term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security fencing or other 
measures to limit access, provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation 
and housing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken under 
section 104(b) of CERCLA, post-removal site control, where appropriate, and any 
emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. 
For the purpose of the NCP, the term also includes enforcement activities related 
thereto. 
40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1995). 
20 "Remedy" or "remedial action (RA),' means: 
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lated enforcement actions.21 All responses must be consistent with the 
National Contingency Plan (NCP).22 
A removal is a short-duration action with an expenditure cap which 
allows EPA to respond quickly to an emergency condition. A remedial 
action is of longer duration and is consistent with a permanent rem-
edy. A response is initiated when EPA is notified of a release. EPA 
undertakes a preliminary assessment to determine the nature and 
scope of the release and whether an immediate removal action is 
necessary. If a removal action is needed, it will be performed accord-
ing to the procedures for such action in the NCP. If a removal action 
is not required, then EPA will undertake a remedial site evaluation 
to further characterize the release. These sites are included on CER-
CLIS,23 and EPA performs a preliminary assessment to allow a deci-
sion on whether to list the site on the National Priorities List 
[Tlhose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of, or in addition to, 
removal action in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance 
into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so 
that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health 
or welfare or the environment. The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions 
at the location of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, 
trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous sub-
stances and associated contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruc-
tion, segregation of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of 
leaking containers, collection of leachate and runoff, on-site treatment or incineration, 
provision of alternative water supplies, any monitoring reasonably required to assure 
that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the environment and, where 
appropriate, post-removal site control activities. The term includes the costs of perm a-
nent relocation of residents and businesses and community facilities (including the cost 
of providing "alternative land of equivalent value" to an Indian tribe pursuant to 
CERCLA section 126(b» where EPA determines that, alone or in combination with 
other measures, such relocation is more cost-effective than, and environmentally pref-
erable to, the transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition 
off-site of such hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the 
public health or welfare; the term includes off-site transport and off-site storage, 
treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of hazardous substances and associated 
contaminated materials. For the purpose of the NCP, the term also includes enforce-
ment activities related thereto. 
40 C.F.R. § 300.5. 
2142 U.S.C. § 9601; 40 C.F.R. § 300.5. 
2242 U.S.C. § 9604(a). The National Contingency Plan is the ''blueprint'' for cleanup and 
remedial action originally developed under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act. CROWELL & 
MORING, THE SUPERFUND MANUAL 4-1 (5th ed. 1993). It was extensively revised, reorganized 
and recodified in March 1990. Id. at 4-1 n.1; see generally National Oil and Hazardous Substance 
Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666 (1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300 et seq.). 
2a CERCLIS, which stands for CERCLA Information System, is EPA's data base and man-
agement system that inventories and tracks releases addressed by the Superfund program. 40 
C.F.R. § 300.5. 
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(NPL).24 Only sites actually listed on the NPL will be remediated 
under Superfund. Sites not listed on the NPL, as well as those for 
which a "no action" alternative is selected,25 may be candidates for 
Brownfields redevelopment, however.26 
As part of the response, EPA may make a future use determination 
that bases response actions and remedies on the anticipated future 
use of the land.27 In this context, institutional controls may allow 
flexible risk-based decisionmaking despite CERCLA's preference for 
permanent solutions and treatment.28 
However, institutional controls may be considered during any phase 
of the response, to limit human activities at or near facilities.29 EPA 
may also use institutional controls to supplement engineering controls 
as part of the final remedy.30 An institutional control may consist of 
restrictions on future uses of land such as an easement, a recorded 
deed restriction, or a provision included within a local zoning plan or 
ordinance. An institutional control may prohibit the use of groundwa-
ter for drinking, or otherwise restrict resource use. These controls 
may be prohibitions on future well-drilling that would compromise a 
remedy, or prohibitions on issuing building permits for certain struc-
tures. Institutional controls also include fences, well-use advisories 
24 The National Priorities List, codified at Appendix B of 40 C.F.R. § 300, is a list of national 
priorities among the known or threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or 
contaminants in the United States for which a remedial action will be considered under Super-
fund. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B). This is only a fraction of those sites evaluated. At the time of 
the 1995 annual update to the NPL, EPA had completed approximately 37,000 preliminary 
assessments (PAs) and approximately 18,000 site investigations (SIs). National Priorities List 
for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, 60 Fed. Reg. 20,330, 20,332 (1995). 
25 EPA's national assessment program identifies and prioritizes sites that will be remediated 
under Superfund as well as those for which "no further remedial action [is] planned" (NFRAP). 
For those sites listed on the NPL, a "no action" alternative is considered for each as part of the 
remedy selection process. 
26 The Brownfields Initiative is an effort to redirect development from greenfields to 
brownfields. Brownfields are generally industrial or commercial sites that have contamination 
or other problems that impose a barrier to future use because of the threat of environmental 
liability to lenders or potential purchasers. See infra Section II.C. 
27 The future use is usually classified as residential, commercial/industrial, or recreational. See 
Krista J. Ayers, Comment, The Potential for Future Use Analysis in Superfund Remediation 
Programs, 44 EMORY L.J. 1503, 1513 n.48 (1995). The classification looks at the amount of time 
humans will spend at the site and whether sensitive populations such as children will be exposed 
to any contaminants remaining at the site following the remediation. [d. 
28 See id. at 1515. 
29 National Oil and Hazardous Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666 (1990) (Preamble discus-
sion). 
30 40 C.F.R. § 3oo.430(a)(I)(iii)(D) (1995). 
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and deed notices. Institutional controls may be used to "further re-
sponsible development" under EPA's new prospective purchaser policy.31 
It is in this context that EPA's need for access to adjacent property 
arises, and in which CERCLA's use of institutional controls in remedy 
selection or redevelopment affects local land-use decisions. 
A. The Need for Access 
Under state common or statutory law, local governments can exer-
cise their police power to abate a nuisance.32 This power has been used 
to enter property and cleanup contamination.33 Where such a hazard 
is a nuisance, there is no unconstitutional taking since landowners 
have no right to use their property in a manner that creates a nui-
sance; it is not part of their bundle of property rights.34 
Additional problems of access have arisen as the nation undertakes 
the massive cleanup efforts contemplated under CERCLA and analo-
gous state statutes. On average, it takes eight years from site aware-
ness to selection of a Superfund remedy, and the actual cleanup effort 
takes an additional forty-three months.35 EPA has listed more than 
1200 sites on the national priorities list,36 and EPA estimates that 
eventually it will evaluate over 30,000 sites for inclusion.37 
In carrying out the extensive remediation activities under these 
programs, governmental agencies have done more than simply enter 
and remove contamination. The remedial design, and the investiga-
tory efforts which precede it, often require offsite soil and groundwa-
ter sampling to determine the extent of the contamination. The Agency 
has installed groundwater monitoring wells on adjacent properties to 
31 Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements with Prospective Purchasers 
of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchasers Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 
34,792 (1995). The new policy supersedes agency policy. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMER-
GENCY RESPONSE, EPA, GUIDANCE ON LANDOWNER LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 107(A) OF 
CERCLA, DE MINIMIS SETTLEMENTS UNDER SECTION 122(G)(I)(B) OF CERCLA, AND SET-
TLEMENTS WITH PROSPECTIVE PURCHASERS OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY, Directive No. 
9835.9 (June 6, 1989); 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,235 (1989). 
32 See Nassr v. Massachusetts, 477 N.E.2d 987, 990-91 (Mass. 1985). 
33 See id. 
34 See id. at 991-93; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-23 
(1992) (stating that "harmful or noxious uses of property may be proscribed by government 
regulation without the requirement of compensation"). 
35 Robert H. Abrams, Using Experience to Improve Superfund Remedy Selection, 29 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 581, 581 (1995). 
36 National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, 54 Fed. Reg. 43,778 (1995). 
37 CROWELL & MORING, supra note 22, at 4-32 & n.65. 
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measure migration of contaminants and the effectiveness of cleanup 
efforts. The EPA uses these wells prior to, during, and in the several 
years following a remediation. In some cases, where contaminated soil 
must be excavated, the government will use adjacent lands to accu-
mulate the spoils or for other staging and storage functions. 
In Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas,38 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the EPA access to property 
adjacent to a contaminated site for what they called Phase I activities 
of a CERCLA remedial design.3!) EPA desired to perform a walk-
through of the property, survey the site, set markers, and collect up 
to twenty-three soil borings.40 The walk-through would include six-
teen EPA officials in seven vehiclesY Three people in a van would 
perform the survey.42 Seventeen people in sixteen vehicles would 
collect the soil borings.43 This activity would require 1000 square feet 
of parking area.44 The EPA intended to take up to seventy days to 
accomplish the work.45 EPA obtained an ex parte warrant from a 
district court when Outboard Marine Corporation (OMC) refused 
permission to enter, which OMC sought to quash.46 The Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed the decision to issue the warrant, finding that CERCLA 
did not authorize access for remediation activities.47 In response to the 
decision in Outboard Marine, Superfund Amendment Reauthoriza-
tion Act (SARA) amendments to the Superfund access provisions 
explicitly gave EPA authority to "compel the release of information 
and to enter property to undertake response activities."48 The same 
provision gave federal courts authority to enjoin property owners 
from interfering with the response.49 This authority does not preclude 
compensation for a taking.50 
'*'773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 479 U.S. 811, vacated and remanded, 479 U.S. 
1002 (1986). 
39 Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
40 I d. at 885. 
41Id. 
42Id. 
43Id. 
44 Outboard Manne, 773 F.2d at 885. 
45Id. 
46 I d. at 886. 
47Id. at 890-91. 
48 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(2)-(3) . 
49Id. § 9604(e)(5)(B)(i). 
50 See Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Hendler IID. 
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As was the case in Outboard Marine, the property owner may not 
consent to EPA access or acquisition. The privacy or property interest 
implicated depends on the level of intrusiveness of the governmental 
action.51 As a constitutional matter, "[ w ]arrantless activity is permis-
sible only if no 'search' has taken place on commercial property .... "52 
For certain entries and inspections, the government may act only 
pursuant to a warrant supported by administrative "probable cause."53 
With increasing duration and intrusiveness of the governmental ac-
tion, compensation for a governmental taking may be required.54 All 
of the major environmental statutes now authorize EPA to enter a 
facility and conduct inspections or remedial activities without explic-
itly requiring a warrant.55 A statutory right of entry gives EPA officials 
a "right to a warrant" whether or not the Fourth Amendment re-
quires one for the proposed activity.56 
When the landowners' right to exclude others is trumped by a 
governmental warrant or order, property owners may choose to seek 
compensation for the taking of their property interests.57 Early court 
51 See Robert M. Andersen, Technology, Pollution Control, and EPA Access to Commercial 
Property: A Constitutional and Policy Framework, 17 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 1,6 (1989) 
(describing the rights as a continuum of escalating privacy and property interests, starting with 
governmental observations performed without entering commercial property, to compliance 
inspections of short durations on commercial property, to long-term governmental presences on 
commercial property to design and effectuate remedial actions). 
52 [d. 
53 [d. 
54 [d. 
55 See, e.g., Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(d) (1994) (authorizing representatives of 
EPA to enter emission sources); Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (1994) (authorizing 
representatives of EPA to enter premises of an effluent source); Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-4(b) (1994) (authorizing representatives of EPA to enter the facilities 
of water suppliers and other permittees); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 
42 U.S.C. § 6927(a) (1994) (authorizing officers, employees, and representatives of EPA to enter 
facilities where hazardous wastes are stored, handled, disposed, etc, as well as premises with 
underground storage facilities); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2610(a) 
(1994) (authorizing representatives of EPA to enter facilities where chemicals are made, stored, 
or processed); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136f-g 
(1994) (authorizing officers and employees of EPA to enter facilities where pesticides and other 
regulated chemicals are held for distribution or sale); Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9604e (1994) (authorizing officers, 
employees, and representatives of EPA to enter facilities or vessels described in the Act). 
FIFRA is the only environmental statute that mentions warrants. 7 U.S.C. § 136g(b). 
56 Andersen, supra note 51, at 32 (citing See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Bunker 
Hill Co. v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1981); Midwest Growers Coop. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455 
(9th Cir. 1976)). 
57 See, e.g., United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260, 1270--71 (D. Mass. 
1988). 
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decisions found EPA's "minor" intrusions justified by concerns about 
protecting health and the environment, and one court found the notion 
that such activity could be a taking "frivolous."58 As takings jurispru-
dence evolved over this same period, courts began to recognize, that 
while the activity may be justified, landowners should not have to 
bear the burden of this public benefit.59 
In Hendler v. United States, owners of property adjacent to the 
Stringfellow Acid Pits Superfund site brought an action in the United 
States Claims Court for just compensation after EPA issued an ad-
ministrative order granting access to their property for the purpose 
of "locating, constructing, operating, maintaining, and repairing moni-
tor/extraction wells."60 Further, the order required plaintiffs not in-
terfere with the activities of the EPA and State of California under 
threat of civil penalties, including punitive damages.61 On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that 
installation of the groundwater monitoring wells was a per se taking 
as a permanent physical invasion at least as intrusive as the cable 
boxes at issue in Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV COrp.62 
At the time of trial, in 1991, at least twenty-two wells had been 
installed. These wells were "100 feet deep, lined with plastic and 
stainless steel, and surrounded by gravel and cement. Each well was 
capped with a cement casing lined with reinforcing steel bars, and 
enclosed by a railing of steel pipe set in cement."63 In comparison, the 
CATV equipment the Supreme Court found was a permanent physical 
invasion in Loretto consisted of only a few cables attached by screws 
and nails and a box attached by bolts.64 The vehicle traffic associated 
with installation and monitoring of the wells was also a permanent 
physical taking even though this activity was intermittent.65 The gov-
58 See United States v. Fisher, 864 F.2d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1988). 
5" Hendler III, 952 F.2d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
60 Hendler v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 91, 93 (1986) [hereinafter Hendler l]. 
61Id. 
62 Hendler III, 952 F.2d at 1376 (citing Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419, 426 (1982». The Claims Court had decided that neither the administrative order nor 
the installation ofthe monitoring wells were a taking and denied plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment. Hendler I, 11 Cl. Ct. at 95-97. The Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the finding that 
mere issuance of the administrative order was not a regulatory taking; however, this ruling was 
limited to the order per se and did not decide whether the order subsequently applied amounted 
to a taking since that issue had not been addressed by the lower court. Hendler III, 952 F.2d 
at 1375. 
63 Hendler III, 952 F.2d at 1376. 
IH Id. (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 422). 
65Id. at 1377-78. 
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ernment had been using plaintiff's property in their cleanup efforts 
at Stringfellow since 1983.66 
Instead of relying on Section 104(e)'s access provisions and requir-
ing a landowner to file an inverse condemnation action, EPA can 
purchase or condemn a full or partial fee in the property under the 
authority of Section 104(j). The activities the court considered a tak-
ing in Hendler are the type that would justify EPA's use of authority 
to acquire property needed to carry out the remedial action.67 
B. Remedy Selection and the Use of Institutional Controls 
Among other things, the NCP sets forth EPA's decisionmaking 
process for selecting CERCLA remedial actions.68 EPA included in 
the codified rule a national program goa169 as well as six "expectations" 
for developing remediation alternatives.70 These expectations are non-
binding.71 
The national goal of the remedy selection process is to select reme-
dies that are protective of human health and the environment, that 
maintain protection over time, and that minimize untreated waste.72 
EPA may select between the remediation alternatives of treatment, 
engineering controls, and institutional controls, or a combination of 
these, to achieve its stated goal.73 
66 Id. at 1367. 
67Id. 
68 Although this article primarily considers remedial actions under CERCLA, the same analy-
sis would apply to corrective actions under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA). In fact, EPA has recently stated its intent to provide parity between the two pro-
grams. See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Corrective Action for Releases from 
Solid Waste Management Units at Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 
19,432, 19,434-35 (1996) [hereinafter Subpart S Initiative]. Through its Hazardous Waste Iden-
tification Rule (HWIR) rulemakings, EPA has recognized the need to consider waste manage-
ment of as-generated process wastes differently from contaminated media and other remedia-
tion wastes. See Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification and Listing of Hazardous 
Waste: Hazardous Waste Identification Rule (HWIR), 60 Fed. Reg. 66,344, 66,347 (1995) [here-
inafter HWIR-Waste]; Requirements for Management of Hazardous Contaminated Media, 61 
Fed. Reg. 18,780, 18,780 (1996) [hereinafter HWIR-Media]. 
69 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(i) (1995). 
70 Id. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii). 
71 National Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666 (1990) (codified 
at 40 C.F.R. § 300 et seq.). 
72 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(i). 
73Id. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii). In relevant part, EPA shall consider the following expectations in 
developing appropriate remedial alternatives: 
(A) EPA expects to use treatment to address the principal threats posed by a site, 
wherever practicable. 
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Remedy selection is probably the most important part of the Su-
perfund program since it determines the private and public costs of 
the cleanup.74 CERCLA provided that its goal of protection of human 
health and the environment be achieved by selecting remedial actions 
which "permanently and significantly [reduce] the volume, toxicity or 
mobility of the hazardous substances, pollutants and contaminants 
.... "75 SARA added specific provisions requiring that remedial ac-
tions result in a level of cleanup or standard of control that at least 
meets the legally applicable or otherwise relevant and appropriate 
federal or state requirements.76 These Section 121 cleanup standards 
are known as Applicable, Relevant, Appropriate Requirements or 
ARARs.77 EPA must look to both federal and state substantive re-
Id. 
(E) EPA expects to use engineering controls, such as containment, for waste that poses 
a relatively low long-term threat or where treatment is impracticable. 
(C) EPA expects to use a combination of methods ... to achieve protection of human 
health and the environment. In appropriate site situations, treatment of the principal 
threats posed by a site ... will be combined with engineering controls (such as con-
tainment) and institutional controls ... for treatment residuals and untreated waste. 
(D) EPA expects to use institutional controls such as water use and deed restrictions 
to supplement engineering controls as appropriate for short- and long-term manage-
ment to prevent or limit exposure to hazardous substances, pollutants, or contami-
nants. Institutional controls may be used during the conduct of the remedial investi-
gation/feasibility study (RIIFS) and implementation of the remedial action and, where 
necessary, as a component of the completed remedy. The use of institutional controls 
shall not substitute for active response measures (e.g., treatment and/or containment 
of source material, restoration of ground waters to their beneficial uses) as the sole 
remedy unless such active measures are determined not to be practicable, based on 
the balancing of trade-offs among alternatives that is conducted during the selection 
of remedy. 
74 See Scott C. Whitney, Superfund Reform: Clarification of Cleanup Standards to Ration-
alize the Remedy Selection Process, 20 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 183, 188 (1995). 
75 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b). 
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A). 
77 The statute does not define ARAR standards. Through its implementation of CERCLA in 
the NCP, EPA has defined the standards as follows: "Applicable requirements" means those 
cleanup standards, standards of control, and other substantive requirements, criteria, or limi-
tations promulgated under federal environmental or state environmental or facility siting laws 
that specifically address a hazardous substance, pollutant, contaminant, remedial action, loca-
tion, or other circumstance found at a CERCLA site. Only those state standards that are 
identified by a state in a timely manner and that are more stringent than federal requirements 
may be applicable. 40 C.F.R. § 300.5. "Relevant and appropriate requirements" are defined as 
those cleanup standards, standards of control, and other substantive requirements, criteria, or 
limitations promulgated under federal environmental or state environmental or facility siting 
laws that, while not "applicable" to a hazardous substance, pollutant, contaminant, remedial 
action, location, or other circumstance at a CERCLA site, address problems or situations 
sufficiently similar to those encountered at the CERCLA site that their use is well suited to 
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quirements to determine the level of cleanup that is applicable, rele-
vant, and appropriate.78 The ARAR process preempts state permit-
ting and other procedural requirements that would otherwise apply 
"onsite."79 
The remedial investigation/feasibility study (RIfFS) process fol-
lows a decision to list the release or facility on the NPL, and develops 
the factual record upon which EPA will base the remedy selection 
decision.80 Once the possible remedies are determined to (1) be pro-
tective of the environment and (2) meet ARARs-both threshold 
criteria-the remedy selected must be judged to be cost effective and 
yet must utilize permanent solutions to the maximum extent practi-
cable.8! 
As part of the remedial investigation, EPA considers both current 
and potential land-use conditions during the site-specific exposure and 
risk assessment.82 This process requires a determination of "how clean 
the particular site. Only those state standards that are identified in a timely manner and are 
more stringent than federal requirements may be relevant and appropriate. Id. Applicable 
requirements are jurisdictional; relevant and appropriate requirements are not. See Whitney, 
supra note 74, at 192. 
78 See Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1526 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that use of substantive 
standards only did not violate CERCLA). 
79 The EPA ARARs Manual establishes three subcategories of ARARs: (1) ambient or chemi-
cal specific requirements, (2) performance, design or other action-specific requirements, and (3) 
location specific requirements. Whitney, supra note 74, at 229 (citing EPA CERCLA COMPLI-
ANCE WITH OTHER LAWS, GENERAL RULES, RCRA, CWA, SDWA, GROUND WATER PROTEC-
TION, EPAl540/6--88/009, OSWER Directive No. 9234.1---D1 (1988) [hereinafter ARARS MAN-
UAL, PART Il; CLEAN AIR ACT AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES AND STATE 
REQUIREMENTS, EPAl540/6--89/009, OSWER Directive No. 9234.1-02 (1989) [hereinafter 
ARARs MANUAL, PART II]); ARARs MANUAL, PART I, supra, at xiv. Location specific require-
ments may include restrictions placed on the concentration of hazardous substances or reme-
diation activities solely because they occur in locations such as wetlands or floodplains. Id. 
Recognizing that remediation is not always confined to the contaminated property, EPA defines 
"onsite" as "the areal extent of contamination and all suitable areas in very close proximity to 
the contamination necessary for implementation of the response action." 40 C.F.R. § 300.5. In 
its proposed rulemaking, EPA rejected an alternative definition of on site which would have 
equated "onsite" with "facility." National Contingency Plan, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,394, 51,407 (1988) 
(proposed December 21, 1988). Because the definition of facility is limited to the areas of 
contamination, it does not include adjacent areas necessary for implementation of the response 
activities. See id. at 51,406. 
80 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(d). 
81 See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1). Both cost effectiveness and permanence of remedy are balancing 
criteria and not threshold requirements in remedy selection. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1)(i)(B); Ohio 
v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
82 The baseline risk assessment includes two components: an exposure assessment and a 
toxicity assessment. National Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666 (1990) (Preamble discussion); 
see 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(d). 
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is clean" and is thus cost-sensitive. Institutional controls may be used 
during the RIIFS, in implementing the remedial action, or as a com-
ponent of the completed remedy.83 The EPA cannot substitute insti-
tutional controls for active response measures as the sole remedy 
unless active measures are determined not to be practicable.84 
EPA has been criticized for overestimating the potential for human 
exposure in evaluating alternative remedies by assuming that the 
future use of land will be residentia1.85 Acknowledging this criticism, 
EPA developed a land-use directive to assist the Regional Offices in 
conducting the baseline risk assessment.86 In considering anticipated 
future land uses, site managers are to use existing information from 
local land-use planning authorities to the extent possible.87 Sources 
and types of information include: 
current land use; zoning laws; zoning maps; comprehensive com-
munity master plans; population growth patterns and projections 
(e.g., Bureau of Census projections); accessibility of site to exist-
ing infrastructure (e.g., transportation and public utilities); insti-
tutional controls currently in place; site location in relation to 
urban, residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural and recrea-
tional areas; federal/state land use designation (federal/state con-
trol over designated lands range from established uses for the 
general public, such as national parks or state recreational areas, 
to governmental facilities providing extensive site access restric-
tions, such as Department of Defense facilities); historical or re-
cent development patterns; cultural factors (e.g., historical sites, 
Native American religious sites); natural resources information; 
potential vulnerability of ground water to contaminants that might 
migrate from soil; environmental justice issues; location of onsite 
or nearby wetlands; proximity of site to a floodplain; proximity of 
&, See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii). 
84 Id. 
85 Under land-use principles, it is not clear to me that EPA can constitutionally dictate a future 
use ofthe land that is incompatible with the surrounding uses, by requiring cleanup to residen-
tial standards when the property is located in an industrial area, for example. See Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379, 387-89 (1926) (upholding constitutionality of 
zoning on its face by equating such land-use restrictions to nuisance law, both of which use the 
police power to prohibit incompatible uses of land). See also DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND 
USE LAW § 1.03 (3d ed. 1993). 
86 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE (OSWER), LAND USE IN THE 
CERCLA REMEDY SELECTION PROCESS, OSWER Directive No. 9355.7-04 (May 25, 1995) 
[hereinafter LAND USE DIRECTIVE]. EPA believes that the Directive will also be applicable to 
corrective actions under RCRA. See Correction Action for Releases from Solid Waste Units at 
Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,432 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
ch. 1) (proposed May 1, 1996). 
87 LAND USE DIRECTIVE, supra note 86, at 5. 
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site to critical habitats of endangered or threatened species; geo-
graphic and geologic information; location of Wellhead Protection 
areas, recharge areas, and other areas identified in a state's Com-
prehensive Groundwater Protection Program.88 
Most of these considerations would indeed affect future land use 
and may lead to selection of institutional controls. Some institutional 
controls may be accomplished through an exercise of the police power; 
others, such as acquisition of an easement or imposition of a deed 
restriction, would require a transfer of the property right from the 
landowner. The Directive therefore anticipates that site managers 
will consult with local planning authorities and other officials as well 
as the greater community.89 Federal officials use "moral suasion" to 
affect local land use decisions,90 and the offer of federal funding to the 
states.91 Because EPA has no legal authority to do more than per-
suade, neither the policy statements reflected in the directive nor the 
"communications" taken pursuant thereto are "policies that have tak-
ings implications" or "actions" as those terms are defined in Executive 
Order 12,630, Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitu-
tionally Protected Property Rights.92 
88 [d. 
H9 [d. at 1. 
90 See Flowers Mill Assocs. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 182, 187--89 (1991). In Flowers Mill, 
the United States Claims Court ruled that, because FAA had no power to prohibit or limit 
proposed construction, an advisory determination that a landowner's proposed building would 
be a hazard to air navigation was not a taking by the federal government even though the State 
had conditioned a construction permit on a favorable opinion. [d. at 188--89. Under the FAA 
regulations, the landowner is not required to secure a permit from the FAA and the FAA has 
no power to prevent construction; therefore, the hazard/no hazard opinion had no enforceable 
legal effect. The regulation is instead designed to use "moral suasion" to encourage voluntary 
cooperation with the regulatory framework. [d. at 187 (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. 
Department of Transp., FAA, 446 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 1971)). A remedy under the Tucker Act 
for inverse condemnation is not available when the federal agency does not have the authority 
to condemn property in carrying out their regulatory functions. See id. 
91 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(a)(I) (1995). 
92 See Exec. Order No. 12,630,53 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8859-61 (1988). Executive Order 12,630 was 
issued by President Reagan following the Supreme Court decisions in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 838-42 (1987) (finding land use exaction without essential nexus 
to permit condition was a taking), and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los 
Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 318--19 (1987) (finding temporary takings compensable). The 
Order recognizes that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is self-executing and requires that 
executive branch agencies undertake an internal review prior to any actions that may have 
takings implications. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 8862. The U.S. Attorney General subsequently issued 
guidelines to assist agencies in undertaking a takings implications assessment (TIA) pursuant 
to the Order. Attorney General Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unan-
ticipated Takings (June 30, 1988). "Actions" under Executive Order No. 12,630 also do not 
include an agency's formal exercise of the power of eminent domain. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 8859-61. 
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Not only is EPA without authority now to engage in land-use 
planning, they may have no authority to implement institutional con-
trols at a site.93 For example, were a modification to a local zoning 
ordinance required, only the local authority could adopt the necessary 
change. Further, state statutes may specify who can be a holder of 
the easement, and in some states, the federal government may not 
acquire certain interests within the state.94 EPA's authority to acquire 
property is also limited by Section 104(j)(2). EPA may only acquire 
an interest in property when the state has provided assurances through 
a contract or cooperative agreement that it will take title upon com-
pletion of the remedial action.95 
Under the Land Use Directive, as well as proposed Section 104(k), 
land-use planning occurs as part of remedy selection and is therefore 
unreviewable until after the cleanup is complete.96 The remedy selec-
tion decision is documented in a Record of Decision (ROD).97 The ROD 
may be prepared by EPA, or by a state delegated as the lead in the 
cleanup.98 
When the cleanup will be financed from the Trust Fund,99 CERCLA 
provides that the federal government may enter into cooperative 
agreements with states under which the state assumes the lead in the 
remedial response. 1OO States may also participate in fund-financed re-
9:1 Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1547 (D.C. Cir. 1993); National Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 
8666,8706 (1990) (noting addition of 40 C.F.R. § 300.510(c)(l). 
94 Jordan, supra note 5, at 480. 
95 42 U.S.C. § 9604(j)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 300.51O(f). 
!l6 42 U.S.C. § 9613. 
97 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(5). The ROD explains the rationale by which the remedies were 
selected and the remediation goals developed by the feasibility study. Id.; see also EPA, 
(INTERIM FINAL) GUIDANCE ON PREPARING SUPERFUND DECISION DOCUMENTS: THE PRO-
POSED PLAN, THE RECORD OF DECISION, EXPLANATION OF SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES, THE 
RECORD OF DECISION AMENDMENT, EPAJ540/G-89/007, OSWER Directive No. 9355.3---02 (July 
1989) [hereinafter EPA ROD GUIDANCE]. The ROD Decision Summary describes the site 
history and the nature of the contamination, the site characteristics, and the site risks including 
human health and environmental risks. See id. at ch. 6. It includes a description of the alternative 
remedial plans which were considered and a discussion of the remedy selected. Id. The Decision 
Summary will identify the major treatment components of the selected remedy and any engi-
neering controls or institutional controls that will be used. Id. It will state how the selected 
remedy meets the statutory ARAR requirements of § 121. Id. 
98 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.500-525 (codifying all regulatory requirements for state participation 
and involvement in CERCLA-authorized response actions). 
99 CERCLA authorized an initial $1.6 billion federal trust fund from which the name "Super-
fund" was coined. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a). 
100 40 C.F.R. § 300.500(b); 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(1)(A). See generally Adam Babich, Environ-
mental Federalism: Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. 
REV. 1516, 1535 (1995). However, states were not allowed to direct the cleanup of released 
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sponses as the support agency in an EPA-led response.101 Where EPA 
has the lead in the response, the state must enter into a Superfund 
state contract102 to provide certain "assurances," including an assur-
ance that, where institutional controls are used, these institutional 
controls are in place, are reliable and will remain in place after initia-
tion of operation and maintenance.103 To further encourage state in-
volvement, states may enter into an EPA/state Superfund Memoran-
dum of Agreement (SMOA).104 
The ROD may specify that adjacent properties be acquired for the 
remedial action.105 The Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) will 
often donate or purchase adjoining property or an easement. For 
instance, in carrying out the remedial action in cleanup of the Hardage 
Superfund Site, the ROD assigned to the PRPs the task of acquiring 
interests in adjacent property that were needed for a containment 
hazardous substances for more than a decade. [d. EPA was authorized to delegate authority to 
the states but had not done so for 13 years. Following the decision in Ohio v. EPA, a portion of 
the NCP was remanded to EPA to either delegate or offer a reasoned explanation of its refusal 
to do so. Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1541-43 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
101 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.500(b). 
102 A "Superfund state contract" is: 
[A] joint, legally binding agreement between EPA and a state to obtain the necessary 
assurances before a federal-lead remedial action can begin at a site. In the case of a 
political subdivision-lead remedial response, a three-party Superfund state contract 
among EPA, the state, and political subdivision thereof, is required before a political 
subdivision takes the lead for any phase of remedial response to ensure state involve-
ment pursuant to section 121(f)(1) of CERCLA. The Superfund state contract may be 
amended to provide the state's CERCLA section 104 assurances before a political 
subdivision can take the lead for remedial action. 
40 C.F.R. § 300.5. For example, the state must assure the availability of hazardous waste 
treatment and disposal facilities. See id. § 300.51O(e)(1). 
103 [d. § 300.510(c)(1). "Operation and maintenance (O&M) means measures required to main-
tain the effectiveness of response actions." [d. § 300.5. CERCLA requires that the state assume 
responsibility for future operations and maintenance (O&M) for the expected life of the remedial 
action. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3). After the remedy is constructed, there is a one-year period during 
which the remedy is operational and functional before maintenance operations are turned over 
to the state. If a remedy, such as containment, will result in hazardous substances remaining at 
the site above levels that allow for unlimited use, then CERCLA requires that the remedial 
action be reviewed every five years. [d. § 9621(c); 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(4)(ii). 
104 40 C.F.R. § 300.500(a). "Superfund Memorandum of Agreement (SMOA)" means: 
[A] nonbinding, written document executed by an EPA Regional Administrator and 
the head of a state agency that may establish the nature and extent of EPA and state 
interaction during the removal, pre-remedial, remedial, and/or enforcement response 
process. The SMOA is not a site-specific document although attachments may address 
specific sites. The SMOA generally defines the role and responsibilities of both the lead 
and the support agencies. 
[d. § 300.5. 
105 See United States V. Hardage, 58 F.3d 569, 576-77 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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remedy.106 That containment remedy included recovery wells in an 
interceptor trench, surface water monitoring, a water treatment sys-
tem for groundwater, liquid recovery wells, and the use of institu-
tional controls "to limit public access to affected areas, to prohibit 
future withdrawal of affected groundwater, and to continue the public 
water supply to area residents."lo7 When the negotiations broke down 
with one landowner, the PRPs sought to use the authority of the court 
under the All Writs Act to force the sale.108 On review, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found this action to be 
improper, but did note that EPA has adequate authority under Sec-
tion 104(j) to purchase or condemn property for this purpose although 
it had not been invoked. 109 
C. The Brownfields Initiative and Institutional Controls 
Proposed Section 104(k) would have been available through the 
Brownfields Initiative to acquire interests in property not subject to 
remedial actions. The threat of Superfund liability has been enough 
to stifle development in many areas surrounding Superfund sites, as 
well as on any "contaminated" property. Where contamination from a 
site has migrated to adjacent properties or into the groundwater, 
many "innocent" landowners are threatened with a possible cleanup 
action for the contamination. EPA estimates that more than eighty-
five percent of NPL sites have contaminated aquifers.110 Even more 
frequently, lenders and developers are reluctant to acquire or finance 
development of any contaminated commercial or industrial properties 
out of fear of liability.111 It is estimated there are "hundreds of thou-
sands" of these brownfields nationwide.112 
The Brownfields Initiative is intended to encourage states to un-
dertake redevelopment of these sites.ll3 Because most Brownfields 
106 United States v. Hardage (Hardage I), 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1484 n.30 (W.D. Okla. 1990), aff'd, 
982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993). 
107 [d. 
108 Hardage, 58 F.3d at 573. 
109 [d. at 576-77 n.7. 
110 Policy Toward Owners of Property Containing Contaminated Aquifers, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,790 
(1995). 
111 See PETER F. GUERRERO, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT, SUPERFUND-BAR-
RIERS TO BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT, GAO/RCED-96-125 (June 1996) (report to Congres-
sional requestors) [hereinafter GAO REPORT). 
112 [d. See also H.R. 2500, § 301(a)(2). 
113 GAO REPORT, supra note 111, at 2. 
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sites are not contaminated enough to be Superfund sites,114 however, 
the federal initiative actually substitutes the stigma with actual ex-
posure to liability. EPA's authority to take action under Sections 106 
and 107 of CERCLA115 is limited now to sites at which EPA can prove 
the following elements of liability: 
(1) each site in question is a "facility"; (2) a "release" or "threat-
ened release" of a "hazardous substance" from the site has oc-
curred or is occurring; (3) the release or threatened release has 
caused the United States (or a private party plaintiff) to incur 
response costs; and (4) the defendants fall within at least one of 
the classes of liable persons described by sections 107(a)(1)-(4)Y6 
If parties are not potentially liable under the statute, EPA has 
neither jurisdiction to order a cleanup of the site under CERCLA, 
nor can EPA make a covenant not to sue. In other provisions of the 
Reauthorization bill, Congress proposed to limit the liability of lend-
ers, innocent landowners, and bona fide purchasers. ll7 The require-
ments for investigation and inquiry in these provisions seem to shift 
the burden of proof to these partiesYs EPA would thus have presump-
tive jurisdiction. This same shifting of proof and presumed jurisdic-
tion occurs when EPA offers to grant a covenant not to sue associated 
with a Brownfields cleanup. Thus, any incentive offered by EPA, and 
accepted by the states (or by the developer, prospective purchaser, or 
other "innocent party") to encourage redevelopment of sites not listed 
on the NPL actually gives federal jurisdiction where before there was 
none. At the least, it shifts the burden of proof from EPA to the 
landowner/developer. 
EPA interprets the liability provisions of CERCLA to apply to 
owners of sites located above a groundwater plume. EPA reasons that 
liability may be imposed on owners of facilities where a hazardous 
substance has come to be located, although its enforcement policy is 
114Id. at 3. 
115 Section 106 authorizes EPA to take actions to abate a release that represents an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health and safety (abatement actions). 42 U.S.C. § 9606. 
Section 107 allows EPA to recover its response costs when they have used the trust fund to 
take remedial action (cost recovery action). 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 
116 CROWELL & MORING, supra note 22, at 5-27. Parties may be liable if they are the current 
owner or operator of the facility, a prior owner or operator, a person who arranged for treatment 
or disposal of a hazardous substance, or a transporter. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
117 H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 302-303, 305 (1995); see also S. 1285, 104th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (1995). 
118 H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 302-303, 305 (1995); see also S. 1285, 104th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (1995). 
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not to pursue these parties unless the homeowner's activities led to a 
release,119 EPA has issued a similar policy to forego enforcement 
action against lenders who have only a security interest in a prop-
erty.120 EPA's determination of liability, however, is not binding. l21 
Only the courts may make that determination under the current 
scheme of CERCLA.122 
For federal guarantees of non-liability, the primary incentive to the 
landowner, lender or prospective landowner is a covenant not to sue 
given by EPA.123 These covenants not to sue have been used with 
settling landowners where there is an ongoing response action, espe-
cially with de minimis contributors to the release.124 With the Brown-
fields Initiative, EPA will use these covenants to settle with prospec-
tive purchasers of "contaminated" property at "sites where federal 
involvement has occurred or is expected to occur."125 
EPA will not give a covenant without adequate "consideration." 
The previous policy called for a monetary payment to EPA from the 
developer.126 An amended policy is more flexible and will allow EPA 
to accept "indirect" benefits in consideration of the covenant not to 
119 60 Fed. Reg. 34,791 n.7 (1995) (citing Policy Towards Owners of Residential Property at 
Superfund Sites, OSWER Directive No. 9834.6 (July 3,1991». 
120 CERCLA Enforcement Against Lenders and Government Entities That Acquire Property 
Involuntarily, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,517, 63,517-18 (1995). EPA had issued a regulation interpreting 
CERCLA's liability provisions as excluding these parties from liability. Lender Liability Under 
CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992). In a subsequent court challenge, the rule was vacated. 
Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, American Bankers Ass'n V. Kelley, 
115 S. Ct. 900, 900 (1995). Although EPA has discretion to choose parties against whom it will 
seek recovery, it may not prevent third parties from bringing a cost recovery action. Kelley, 15 
F.3d at 1107--08. This snag was addressed through the Reauthorization bill as well. See H.R. 
2500, § 304. 
121 Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1107-08. 
122Id. 
123 EPA's Covenant Not to Sue protects the settling purchaser, lender or landowner from 
actions "for any and all civil liability for injunctive relief or reimbursement of response costs 
pursuant to Sections 106 or 107(a) of CERCLA." 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 34,797 (1995). EPA 
reserves its rights to sue for any contamination not expressly defined in the agreement, as well 
as for natural resource damages, violation of other environmental regulations, and the right to 
take response actions under CERCLA at the site. Although a settling party would not have to 
pay for such a future response action, they would have to prove that the release was attributable 
to the "Existing Contamination" covered by the agreement. Id. 
124 See 42 U.S.C. §9622. See also Revised Model De Minimis Contributor Consent Decree and 
Administrative Order on Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,849 (1995). 
125 EPA's prior policy was to offer a covenant not to sue only at sites "where enforcement 
action is anticipated." 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 34,793. 
126Id. 
294 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:2 
sue.127 EPA's stated intent is to influence land-use decisions through 
this process. They explain that: 
[I]ndirect benefits to the community include measures that serve 
to reduce substantially the risk posed by the site, creation or 
retention of jobs, development of abandoned or blighted property, 
creation of conservation or recreation areas, or provision of com-
munity services (such as improved public transportation and in-
frastructure) ... [EPA intends to continue its] commitment to 
environmental protection [and] environmental justice [and there-
fore will] carefully weigh the public interest considerations of 
creating jobs in the inner city, where older contaminated indus-
trial properties are often located, against the possibility of further 
environmental degradation of industrial property in mixed indus-
trial/residential areas.128 
Therefore, EPA will work with purchasers to "ensure proper cleanup 
and promote responsible land use."129 
The Brownfields Initiative is an ongoing effort to "facilitate the 
productive use of industrial and commercial properties by addressing 
the existing regulatory impediments to the financing, transfer and 
appropriate reuse of these properties."13o Toward this end, the states, 
using a Superfund Memorandum of Agreement (SMOA), are entering 
into agreements with EPA to "exercise their authorities and use their 
resources in ways that are mutually complementary and are not du-
plicative."131 EPA is seeking to formalize the state programs with new 
authority under Superfund Reauthorization.132 
Section l04(k) would facilitate EPA's involvement by allowing EPA 
to accept institutional controls as consideration for a covenant not to 
sue. The new policy requires a calculation offsetting benefits or "wind-
fall[s]" that will accrue to the landowner or purchaser from cleanup. ISS 
According to the policy, institutional controls may be considered as an 
127Id. 
128 Id. at 34,794. 
129 Id. 
130 See Superfund Memorandum of Agreement Between the Indiana Department of Environ-
mental Management and the USEPA, Region V, Addendum (executed December 4,1995). 
131 See Superfund Memorandum of Agreement between the Illinois Environmental Protection 
Agency and the USEPA, Region V, Addendum No.1 (executed April 6, 1995). 
132 The purpose of federal action in cleaning up Brownfields is to "significantly increase the 
pace of response activities at contaminated sites by promoting and encouraging the creation, 
development, and expansion of State voluntary response programs." H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 
1st Sess. § 301(b) (1995). This will occur by using "[sJtate voluntary programs to address 
environmental contamination, and Federal liability reforms to encourage lenders and developers 
to invest in brownfield sites." Id. § 301(a)(6). 
133 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 34,795 (1995). 
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offsetting value in EPA's favor. l34 Although H.R. 2500 proposed to use 
voluntary state programs to carryout the cleanups and manage the 
program, with the new authority from Section 104(k), EPA could 
retain the property interest acquired with the institutional control. 
Or, the hazardous substance easement could be assigned to a state or 
other governmental entity capable of enforcing the provisions.135 In 
either case, EPA could require public participation or other require-
ments to further federal goals. 
States are proceeding without federal authorization to enact volun-
tary remediation programs for sites not listed on the NPL.136 The 
states also are offering agreements not to take enforcement action 
under state law against non-responsible parties.137 The state SMOAs 
may include promises by EPA to the state to refrain from enforce-
ment when the parties participate in a voluntary cleanup. 
III. THE PROPERTY INTEREST, THE POWER, AND THE DILEMMA: 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACQUISITION AND REGULATION OF 
PROPERTY IN THE CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 
Section 104(j) of CERCLA currently allows the EPA to acquire 
property, including easements, to accomplish Superfund's remediation 
goals. If EPA has authority under Section 104(j) to acquire easements 
for access and to implement and assure the effectiveness of the rem-
edy, then what additional authority would be granted by Section 
104(k)? Upon examination, it is clear that where Section 104(j) has an 
environmental purpose, Section 104(k) has a land use purpose. In 
addition, Section 104(j) allows acquisition of a state law property 
interest, whereas Section 104(k) creates a federal property interest 
that includes regulatory powers. 
This section makes three points. First, the property interest that 
could be acquired by the EPA under Section 104(k) has a broad public 
purpose and is not incidental to Superfund's environmental purpose. 
Second, the power of the federal government to purchase or condemn 
property has constitutional limits that are exceeded by the grant of 
authority in Section 104(k). Third, this overreaching invades the sov-
ereignty of the states and thus raises federalism concerns.138 
134 [d. 
135 H.R. 2500, § 104(k)(8)(A). 
136 See, e.g., 21 Tex. Reg. 3203, 3210 (1996). 
137 [d. 
138 Four principal values support preservation of the federal system: (1) a dual system of 
government checks abuses of power in any branch of the system; (2) state and local governments 
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A. The Property Interest 
All "easements" are not created equally.139 In the traditional sense, 
the law used all types of servitudes to "recogniz[e] and facilitat[e] the 
right of private parties to reallocate and rearrange the benefits and 
burdens of property ownership and occupancy."140 Easements have 
been used to create transportation and utility corridors, to exploit 
natural resources, to limit development, to secure mortgages, to en-
force subdivision or condominium regulations including architectural 
modifications to structures, maintenance of property, or use of com-
mon areas, and to levy assessments to pay for operations of neighbor-
hood associations.141 
The purpose of a traditional common law easement is very narrow 
because it benefits and burdens a particular piece of property. Com-
increase the opportunities for citizens to participate actively in the democratic process and 
create diverse cultural and political environments; (3) the distribution of power among fifty-one 
different governments enhances opportunities for innovation and experimentation; and (4) state 
and local governments check federal authority by regulating areas that the federal government 
chooses to ignore. Babich, supra note 100, at 1516 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 
(1991)). But see generally Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a 
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994), arguing that the dual sovereign structure of 
federalism should be replaced with managerial decentralization. Rubin and Feeley observe that 
the federal courts have been "consistent opponents" of federalist positions over the years as we 
have "tr[ied] to extricate ourselves from federalism for at least the last 130 years." Id. at 908. 
Although state interests are protected in federal legislation to a great degree through the 
political process, our congressional legislators are primarily representatives of the national 
government and not of the states. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1855 
(1995) (congressional representatives owe primary allegiance not to the people of a state, but 
to the people of a Nation). 
139 Jeffrey A. Blackie, Note, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Changed Condi-
tions, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1989). The term easement here is used generically to apply to any 
servitude, whether a classic easement, a real covenant or equitable servitude. A classic ease-
ment is a non-possessory interest in property. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 450 
(1944). It runs with the land. Id. A real covenant is a promise respecting the use of land that 
will bind both the parties to the covenant as well as successors to their real property rights. 
Blackie, supra, at 1188 n.6. An equitable servitude is similar but does not meet the formal 
requirements of a real covenant; it will therefore be enforced only against successors who have 
knowledge of the original agreement. Id. at 1188 n.7. 
140 Susan F. French, Gallivan Conference: Tradition and Innovation in the New Restatement 
of Servitudes: A Report From Midpoint, 27 CONN. L. REV. 119, 123 (1994). Generally, servitudes 
have been used to implement four distinct kinds of modifications to the underlying land law: (1) 
shared use arrangements in which users need not acquire an "ownership" interest in the land; 
(2) arrangements to limit development of land; (3) arrangements to assure a flow of payments, 
goods, services, or other benefits from the owner or occupant ofland; and (4) arrangements by 
which land is subjected to a local governance structure and provides the resources for govern-
mental operations. Id. at 120. 
141Id. 
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mon law easements are generally classified as either (1) in gross,142 (2) 
appurtenant and reciprocal,143 or (3) appurtenant and nonreciprocaU44 
Appurtenant easements are between neighbors.145 They may be affir-
mative or negative. Where an affirmative easement (easement appur-
tenant) permits specific conduct by the easement holder, a negative 
easement (easement in gross) disallows conduct by the landowner. 
The common law disfavored negative easements because they lacked 
the flexibility of appurtenant covenants that also require neighborly 
accommodation and goodwill.146 There are common law policy reasons 
against enforcement of in gross covenants as well, particularly to 
prohibit dead hand control of property. 
In contrast to traditional easements, easements acquired pursuant 
to the Uniform Conservation Easement Act and state laws providing 
for conservation easements147 are intended to benefit the public, rather 
than a specific parcel of land or a private individual.l48 Most state 
conservation easement statutes allow landowners to grant an ease-
ment to governmental units or private nonprofit organizations known 
as land trustS.149 "Land trusts are private, charitable organizations 
that acquire and hold full and partial interests in property to preserve 
the property in perpetuity."l50 Some state statutes prohibit the federal 
government from holding such an interest in the state.151 
142 The benefit of the servitude is not associated with a dominant parcel owned by the 
covenantee. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 453-54 (1944). 
143 The land of covenantor A, is burdened by a real covenant for the benefit of neighboring 
property owned by covenantee B, whose own parcel is burdened by an identical covenant for 
the benefit of Ns land. Especially a reciprocal subdivision covenant. 
144 A covenant benefits a nearby property but without a reciprocal covenant benefiting the 
covenantor. See Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy·Analysis 
in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEx. L. REV. 433, 468 (1984). 
145 [d. 
146 See id. at 468, 473. 
147 A conservation easement is created when a grantor sells specified development rights in 
a piece of property but retains the underlying fee. 
148 Blackie, supra note 139, at 1200-01. The Uniform Conservation Easement Act provides 
that the purposes of a valid conservation easement must "include retaining or protecting the 
natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring the availability of real property 
for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintain-
ing or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, 
or cultural aspects of real property." UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 
§ 1(1) (1996). 
149 Daniel C. Stockford, Comment, Property Tax Assessment of Conservation Easements, 17 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 823, 824-25 (1990). 
150 [d. at 825 n.9. 
151 Jordan, supra note 5, at 479. 
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The purpose of an easement authorized by statute is found in both 
the enabling statute and within the four corners of the easement 
deed.152 The statement of purpose in a deed usually mirrors the lan-
guage in the statute.153 The purpose may thus be broadly worded to 
reflect a regulatory goal or public purpose. As with traditional servi-
tudes, the party granting a statutory easement seeks to gain some 
benefit in exchange for the burden placed upon the property. Ease-
ments granted for conservation purposes, for example, may create 
burdens, such as restrictions on development, restrictions on agricul-
tural use, or dedication of lands to wetlands preservation, in return 
for benefits such as property tax abatement, tax deductions, debt 
forgiveness, crop subsidy payments, or technical assistance.154 Land-
owners may realize income, estate, or property tax benefits by donat-
ing a conservation easement to a qualifying agency or organization.155 
Many state conservation easement statutes provide that imposing a 
conservation restriction on the property will reduce the property tax 
valuation of the burdened land.156 
When the easement has a public beneficiary and a public purpose, 
the nature of the property interest changes. There is a shift in power 
from the private property owner to the public, and in the case of 
federal LURES, from the state and local government to the federal 
152 See Blackie, supra note 139, at 1200. 
153 [d. 
154 [d. at 1198 n.67 (discussing both the statutory and non-statutory characteristics of conser-
vation easements, and noting that another author suggested that ''whether a conservation 
easement is analogous to a traditional easement or covenant depends on the type of grant in 
the conservation easement"- while "prohibiting billboards would be similar to a negative 
easement, prohibiting subdivision for commercial development is closer to a traditional real 
covenant, while prohibiting excavation or dumping of trash is closer to a restriction"). See also 
infra Section III.C. 
155 Stockford, supra note 149, passim. 
156 [d. at 830. In California, for example, the state legislature acted to halt the conversion of 
farm land and open lands as cities and suburbs sprawled outward. Joel Cutler, Book Review, 12 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 215, 217 (1985) (reviewing THOMAS S. BARRE'IT & PUTNAM LIVER-
MORE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1983». The California Constitution 
required property tax assessments be based on the land's highest and best economic use ofland, 
which had resulted in inflation ofland values as market demand for undeveloped land increased. 
[d. at 215. A subsequent Constitutional amendment permitted the legislature to specify that 
certain lands be taxed on a present use value rather than their highest economic use value. The 
state then passed the Open Space Easement Act authorizing preferential tax treatment for 
locally approved conservation easements. Open-Space Easement Act of 1974, CAL. GOv'T. CODE 
§§ 51070-51097 (West 1983). This statute provides that a local government or a qualified non-
profit conservation organization may obtain a conservation easement on farm or open land. The 
easement must be granted for at least ten years, run with the land, and be approved by the 
local governing body consistent with a locally adopted open space plan. Cutler, supra, at 218. 
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government.157 Professor Korngold has cautioned that the veto power 
held by owners of private conservation servitudes in gross preempts 
the democratic debate that normally attends community decisions 
over the amount and type of community growth that is desirable.158 
A federal easement would have a similar but more radical effect.159 
The power to control community development has traditionally been 
reserved to local governments through their exercise of the planning, 
zoning and subdivision approval processes.160 When the federal gov-
ernment acquires an interest in the land, it may acquire regulatory 
powers over the land as well, depending on what interest is assigned. 
When the government is the holder of the easement, it may incorpo-
rate terms and conditions into the instrument that resemble regula-
tions, to the extent the terms are consistent with the purpose of the 
acquisition.161 
As noted, the easement deed mirrors the statutory authorization. 
Therefore, by comparing the nature of the interest granted in a classic 
easement deed with a grant of a public interest, the shift in power 
that would occur by modifying the statutory purpose becomes more 
apparent. To the extent the transfer is compensated through the 
taking of a property interest, there is generally no constitutional 
infirmity. However, too great a shift in power to the federal govern-
ment implicates federalism concerns. 
157 See Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982). 
158 Korngold, supra note 144, at 458--61. 
159 The National Conference of State Legislatures and others, as amici curiae in United States 
v. Lopez opposing the Gun Free Schools Act, were concerned that injecting federal officials into 
local problems causes friction and diminishes political accountability of state and local govern-
ments. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1641 (1995). 
160 See Korngold, supra note 144, at 458. 
161 The federal government has authority to incorporate rules and regulations into easement 
agreements. See North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 305 n.6 (1983). This is not 
authority for the idea that federal regulations can create property interests not recognized by 
state law. See Jordan, supra note 5, at 466. Consider the effect of easements acquired pursuant 
to the farm programs. See infra notes 255--60. The landowner may be required under the terms 
and conditions of the easement to maintain the property-affirmative obligations-for the life 
of the easement or in perpetuity. Even when a federal land-use restriction easement is acquired 
voluntarily, the federal agency includes conditions in the deed resembling regulations or incor-
porates regulations by reference. Thus the regulations sought to be avoided by property owners 
are incorporated into a deed and are an encumbrance on the property. The enforcement mecha-
nisms available to the grantee are also more severe than enforcement of similar police power 
regulations. The landowner may risk forfeiture of property for noncompliance with the condi-
tions and may have to repay the consideration given for property interest. 
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A "negative restrictive deed" is the type of interest generally used 
and recognized in private real estate transactions.162 It states the "do's 
and don'ts respecting how the land will be managed."163 If additional 
uses or prohibitions are desired at some time in the future, additional 
compensation will have to be paid and another instrument drafted, 
making negative restrictive deeds inflexible to a grantee agency. These 
deeds also present challenges to enforcement.164 As a response, federal 
agencies acquiring conservation easements began to use "results-ori-
ented deeds" that read more like a regulation, stating the easement's 
conservation goals rather than the specific activities allowed or pro-
hibited. This instrument gave the agency a veto power when an 
activity was not consistent with the goaU65 The agency's right to say 
"no" in a results-oriented deed is effectively a "duty to negotiate."166 
More recently, the Forest Service and others have begun to use a 
"reserved interest deed."167 With this instrument, the grantee ac-
quires all rights, title and interests in a property except those rights 
specifically reserved by the landowner.168 Any interest not expressly 
reserved is transferred to the easement holder.169 
162 See James B. Snow, Reserved Interest Deeds: An Alternate Approach to Drafting Conser-
vation Easements, THE BACK FORTY (Land Conservation Law Inst., San Francisco, CA), 
Jan./Feb. 1992, at 1. 
163 Id. For example, the deed might state that: Landowner conveys to Grantee a perpetual 
easement whereby Landowner agrees for himself and his heirs and assigns that he will not do 
any of the following: no structures shall be built, no subdivision, no draining, etc. Id. at 4. 
164 Id. at 3. 
165 Id. at 3-4. For example, the deed may state that the landowner agrees not to do anything 
that would "substantially impair scenic, pastoral, fish and, wildlife values of the area." Id. at 4. 
166 Id. 
167 Snow, supra note 162, at 4. 
168 Id. For example, the deed may provide that Landowner conveys to Grantee all right, title 
and interest in the property, reserving to himself and his heirs and assigns only the following 
rights in the property: the right to plant and grow row crops, orchards, etc. Id. 
169Id. Easements conveyed under a reserved interest deed are deceptive. If the only interest 
reserved to the fee holder is the equivalent of a license, such as the grazing permit at issue in 
McKinley v. United States, 828 F. Supp. 888 (D.N.M. 1993), and that license can be amended or 
revoked at will by the legislature or their delegee, then it seems there is really a taking in the 
first instance of all the incidents of the property. In McKinley, the United States District Court 
for the District of New Mexico found that the United States Forest Service was not required 
to perform a takings implication assessment (TIA) prior to modifying a grazing permit in a 
national forest. McKinley, 828 F. Supp. at 893. Presumably, grazing was a permitted use under 
an easement granted to the Forest Service; the permit holder was the owner of the fee. 
McKinley, 828 F. Supp. at 893. The Forest Service is authorized to issue grazing permits on 
lands within the National Forests. Id. at 890; 16 U.S.C. § 5801. The court found that, even if 
modification of the permit reduced the value of the property base and the economic viability of 
the ranching operation, the grazing permit nonetheless added value to his property and was a 
"benefit and privilege bestowed by the government" specifically excluded from activities subject 
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Now compare the statutory purpose of Section 104(j) with that of 
Section 104(k). The statutory authorization for an easement acquired 
pursuant to Section 104(j) is restricted to purposes "needed to conduct 
a remedial action."170 This purpose is incidental to the environmental 
and remedial nature of the statute as a whole.l71 EPA would have to 
justify its use of authority to acquire property in each instance. Under 
this section, it is the various state laws which determine how the 
interest must be created and construed.172 The easement is privately 
negotiated even though the selection of institutional controls occurs 
during the Superfund remedy selection process.173 
In contrast to the purpose of Section 104(j), the purpose of proposed 
Section 104(k) is public in nature: "to prevent exposure to, reduce the 
likelihood of, or otherwise respond to a release or threatened release 
of a hazardous substance."174 This statement offers an aspirational 
goal as broad as CERCLA itself, but divorced from any of the regu-
latory standards that implement it. It would convey unlimited rights 
to the grantee, to be used at the Agency's discretion, similar to the 
reserved interest deed. It would therefore give EPA authority to 
make decisions regarding land-use that it can only influence now 
under its Land Use Directive.175 Even the title of the section, "[h]az-
ardous substance property use" reflects a broader purpose to control 
land use. 
EPA's use of Section 104(k) would not be limited to remedial actions 
but could extend to Brownfields redevelopment. Under the prospec-
tive purchaser policy, EPA will only consider entering into a settle-
ment agreement when a settlement is "practicable and in the public 
interest;" the surrounding community and other members of the pub-
lic must be afforded an opportunity to comment on the settlement, 
including the institutional controls that may be exchanged in return 
to Executive Order 12,630, meaning that facially there was no property interest at stake. 
McKinley, 828 F. Supp. at 893. What remains is not subject to an additional takings c1aims-
precisely the result sought by using the reserved interest deed. See Snow, supra note 162. 
Although grazing permits have always been revocable at will and are not "property" that can 
be taken by eminent domain, other activities that are "reserved" to a fee holder in a reserved 
interest deed would have the same status. The permit holder in McKinley was, after all, the 
owner of the underlying fee. McKinley, 828 F. Supp. at 890. 
170 42 U.S.C. § 9604(j)(1). 
171 See discussion of facts in Hardage I, supra notes 106--D8 and accompanying text. 
172 See infra Section IV.C. 
173 See supra Section ILB. 
174 H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. Section 104(k)(1) (1995). 
175 See supra Section n.B. 
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for EPA's covenant not to sue.176 Although notice and comment is not 
a "legal requirement" for prospective purchasers, who cannot be li-
able parties until they acquire the land, EPA wants to "seek coopera-
tion with state and local government" and "facilitate public input" 
because of the land use issues involved.177 
Through the public participation process, there is an expanded 
federal role. Public participation is a regulatory process that assumes 
a public decisionmaker acting in the public interest. In this manner, 
EPA enters the local land-use decisionmaking process as an arbiter 
of "rights," acting in a regulatory capacity. 
Section 104(k) thus accomplishes a transfer of regulatory power 
over land-use planning from state and local governments to the fed-
eral government through its broad public purpose. Additional evi-
dence of Section 104(k)'s public nature is found in Paragraph eleven, 
giving private rights of enforcement through citizen's suits,178 The 
nature of the interest that is authorized by Section 104(k) raises 
serious federalism concerns. 
B. The Power 
Whether imposed by an easement deed acquired through purchase 
or condemnation, or as an exercise of the police power, there are 
conditions on the use of land inherent in any land-use regulation.179 
176 This is required for de minimis settlements under § 122(g)(B)(1) of CERCLA. Prospective 
purchasers are not covered by this section because they are not currently the landowner and 
therefore have no current liability subjecting them to CERCLA's requirements or EPA's juris-
diction. See Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements With Prospective 
Purchasers of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 34,792, 34,795 (1995). 
177Id. at 34,795. 
178 H.R. 2500, Section 104(k)(1l). Compare similar third party enforcement requirements 
under the Uniform Conservation Easement providing that if the charitable holder fails in its 
obligations as a public trustee to enforce the restriction, any other organization that could 
qualify as a holder can seek to enforce the restriction. See Blackie, supra note 139, at 1201 n.82. 
The UCEA allows a private organization to be a holder of the easement. Where private 
organizations have been allowed to hold conservation easements, the charitable organization 
generally must have among its responsibilities "retaining or protecting the natural, scenic, or 
open-space values of real property." Id. n.78; see UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 12 
U.L.A. § 1(2) (1996). Section 104(k) allows an easement to be assigned to a state or other 
governmental entity, but does not explicitly provide for assignment to private entities, although 
subsequent assignments by other federal or state agencies to private organizations may not be 
foreclosed. 
179 See generally Symposium, A New Era for the Western Public Lands: When "Private" 
Rights Meet "Public" Rights: The Problems of Labeling and Regulatory Takings, 65 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 193 (1994). 
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Even easements between purely private parties involve some legis-
lative restrictions.I8o But the nature of those restrictions varies de-
pending on the nature of the interest and the holder of the interest. 
It is therefore necessary to determine whether the land-use planning 
purpose of Section 104(k) is a valid public purpose for exercise of the 
federal power of eminent domain as well as the constitutionality of 
the land-use planning purpose pursuant to the commerce and spend-
ing powers of Congress. 
An interest in property may be acquired by the government by 
purchase, condemnation, or as an exaction or condition on the grant 
of a benefit conferred by government. Constitutional restrictions on 
the exercise of governmental power limit all three methods. 
Congress may authorize a taking of private property for a public 
purpose provided just compensation is paid.I81 The power of eminent 
domain is an inherent power of sovereignty and no statutory authori-
zation is necessary.I82 The mechanism for exercising that authority is 
nonetheless provided at 40 U.S.C. § 257, which authorizes an officer 
of the United States to acquire land by condemnation "in every case 
in which [the officer] ... has been, or hereafter shall be, authorized 
to procure real estate ... for public use."183 All federal condemnations 
are brought under Rule 71A, a procedural rule intended to provide 
180 See Epstein, supra note 157, at 1359. 
181 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
182 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1875) (finding power of federal government to 
condemn property exists even without state consent). This power is implied because it is 
necessary and appropriate to the exercise of the federal government's delegated powers. See 
Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federal-
ism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 834-35 (1989) (citing United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 
160 U.S. 668, 679, 681 (1896». 
183 40 U.S.C. § 257. See Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 
1967). EPA, who has only delegated authority, can exercise the power of eminent domain to the 
extent authorized by Congress. When an agency of the federal government is granted the power 
to acquire property under other statutes, the agency may elect to proceed either under the 
specific grant or under § 257. When Congress delegates eminent domain authority to a federal 
agency, that agency's exercise of their eminent domain authority may be reviewed under an 
ultra vires standard to determine whether they have acted within the scope of their authority 
and under an arbitrary and capricious standard for the manner in which they exercised their 
authority. Department of Interior v. 16.03 Acres of Land, 26 F.3d 349, 355 (2d Cir. 1994). Under 
the federal condemnation statute, the federal government may acquire the interest it believes 
is required by bringing an eminent domain action in federal court. 40 U.S.C. § 257. A "quick 
take" has been available under § 258; this section was omitted in 1995 as being superseded by 
Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The nature and extent of the interest to be 
acquired are in the government's sole discretion. See United States v. 101.88 Acres of Land, 616 
F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1980). The landowner may recover damages for the actual taking which 
is not included in the declaration of taking by seeking compensation under the Tucker Act, but 
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some uniformity to federal condemnation procedures;184 however, the 
substantive law of the state defines the property interest at stake.185 
Other than the requirement to pay compensation, the only effective 
constitutional limitation on congressional power to condemn land is 
the public purpose requirement. Although the public purpose require-
ment is coterminous with the sovereign's police power,186 what is a 
public purpose for one sovereign may not be a public purpose for 
another.187 
Our government is a government of dual sovereigns. Those powers 
not provided to the federal government by the United States Consti-
tution were reserved to the States. Because the power to condemn is 
considered to be co-extensive with the power to purchase/88 it is 
necessary to look at the respective state and federal powers in general 
to determine whether the exercise of eminent domain would be ap-
propriate for land-use planning purposes. 
State and local governments have plenary power to regulate for the 
general welfare of their citizens. It has long been recognized that state 
and local governments may engage in land-use planning constitution-
ally.189 A municipality may under the police power prevent develop-
ment from harming the health, safety or welfare of its citizens, or the 
municipality may allow the developer to internalize any harms or 
costs to the community and proceed with the development.19o A com-
mon practice in local land-use regulation is to require that developers 
provide public amenities as a condition for receiving permission to 
the court is without power to increase or decrease the property interest condemned in the 
eminent domain action. [d. at 770-71. 
184 FED. R. CIV. P. 71A(k). See CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3041 (2d ed. 1982). 
185 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 184, at § 3042. 
186 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1015-16 (1984); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 
467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
187 See United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1935) (citing 
Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905». Therefore, in Certain Lands in Louisville, the federal 
government did not have the authority to condemn property for public housing, although state 
and local governments could do so. [d. 
ISS Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 1967) (noting that 
40 U.S.C. § 257 has been consistently interpreted to authorize acquisition by condemnation 
where authority to purchase has been conferred); Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 
U.S. 581, 581 (1923). 
189 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
190 This would be the exercise of a lesser power. When the authority has the greater power 
to prevent the activity, it also has the lesser power to allow the activity with conditions. See 
Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 474 n.7 (1991); see also infra Section IV.D. 
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develop property in a manner that government could otherwise pro-
hibit through exercise of its police power.191 
The federal government exercises its power for the purpose of this 
discussion through the Commerce Clause, the spending power, and 
the property power. The federal government has authority to engage 
in land-use planning for public lands under the Property Clause of 
the United States Constitution.192 Congress regulates private activity 
pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause.193 The federal 
government may exercise its power under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate for the general welfare when the activity will have a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.l94 In addition, the United States 
Supreme Court has upheld federal legislation that has imposed con-
ditions on the receipt of federal spending in areas where Congress 
could not regulate directly.195 Courts have held that Congress may 
exercise its taxing and spending power as necessary and appropriate 
to carry out its legitimate government functions.196 
Generally, the federal government may acquire land for military 
purposes,197 navigation purposes,t98 and as necessary and proper to 
carry out its legitimate functions.199 Although rarely questioned, the 
power of eminent domain is not unlimited; it must be used toward a 
legitimate end.2°O The United States Supreme Court in Berman v. 
Parke1-/l1J1 noted, as evidence of the broad scope of eminent domain 
rather than its limitation: "Once the object is within the authority of 
191 See Been, supra note 190, at 479. Exactions are related to the older practice of levying 
"special assessments" to pay for public improvements on land that will receive a direct and 
special benefit from improvements such as paving or infrastructure. [d. The initial difference 
was that exactions were imposed up front as a way to shift the initial cost and risk to the 
developer. [d. Later, communities began to require dedications for park space, schools and other 
amenities, or a fee in lieu of land. [d. at 480. 
192 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976); see infra Section IILC. 
193 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). 
194 See infra Section IV.B. 
195 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-12 (1987). 
196 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937) (finding social security tax on employees 
and employers a constitutional exercise to address national problem of unemployment); United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,70 (1936) (finding use of spending power to enter into agriculture 
production contracts with farmers coercive). 
197 United States ex rei. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1946); Old 
Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 63 (1925). 
198 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173-76 (1979); United States v. Chandler-Dun-
bar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 72-73 (1913). 
199 See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223 (1845) (stating that sovereign power of 
eminent domain does not mean all sovereign power but only those powers given to the federal 
government by the Constitution). 
200 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1014-15 (1984). 
201 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
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Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent 
domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means 
to the end."202 
Because it is an attribute of federal as well as state sovereignty, a 
state may not interfere with the legitimate exercise of the federal 
government's power of eminent domain.203 In North Dakota v. United 
States, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the federal power 
to acquire wetlands under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act. 204 
Under that statute, Congress had conditioned the federal govern-
ment's power to acquire wetlands easements on prior state consent. 
It was clear that, in the absence of federal legislation to the contrary, 
the United States could acquire the easements by purchase or con-
demnation without state consent.205 
It is the legitimacy of the power to purchase or condemn for land-
use planning purposes that is questionable in proposed Section 104(k). 
The purpose is so broad that there is no effective limit on the use 
of the power to acquire interests in property. The bill specifically 
withdraws the requirements of Section 104(j) that the easements be 
"needed to conduct a remedial action."206 There is no "nexus" required 
at all.207 With the absence of a nexus, the purpose of the acquisition 
could fall outside the bounds of legitimate commerce or spending 
powers, invading the province of the states to otherwise regulate land 
use. The public purpose requirement as a limitation on federal power 
thus protects federalism values. 
C. The Dilemma 
At the same time that limits on the Commerce Clause are being 
rediscovered,208 and the role of states reemphasized,209 a stronger federal 
202 Id. 
203 North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 321 (1983). 
204 I d. at 301. 
205 Id. at 310 (citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963); Kohl v. United States, 91 
U.S. 367, 371-72 (1876». 
206 H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. Section 104(k)(12) (1995). H.R. 2500 provides in relevant 
part that "[a]ny such easement ... shall not be subject to the requirements of section 104(j) 
.... " Id. 
207 "Once such a connection is no longer required ... there is no end to the social transforma-
tions that can be accomplished by so-called 'regulation,' at great expense to the democratic 
process." Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1,22 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
208 See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995); discussion infra Section IV.B. 
209 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-'32 (1996); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992). But see Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), 
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role is being asserted in land-use decisions through environmental 
controls.210 
The tension between land-use regulation and environmental regu-
lation was observed by the United States Supreme Court in Califor-
nia Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co .. 2l1 In finding that a state 
environmental regulation was not preempted by the Forest Service 
regulation of federal lands, the court noted that land-use planning 
chooses particular uses for the land, whereas environmental regula-
tion requires that, however the land is used, damage to the environ-
ment is kept within prescribed limits.212 
Although the federal government has plenary authority to regulate 
land use on federal lands, as in Granite Rock, regulation of land use 
of other than federal lands has historically been the exclusive province 
of state and local governments.213 Through increasing environmental 
regulation of land use, there has been some convergence between 
environmental regulation and land-use planning as federal policies 
have directly impacted local land use, state police power, and personal 
property rights.214 
This push-pull of interests is reflected in the national policy for 
protecting coastal lands in the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) 
which promotes both protection and development.215 To avoid direct 
federal regulation of land-use planning, the CZMA presumes that 
state land-use planning is a state affair and provides federal oversight 
in the form of conditional funding and program review.216 To encourage 
states to engage in land-use planning along the coasts, the federal 
government provides funding for program development and imple-
mentation.217 To be eligible for funding, a state must develop a feder-
ally-approved program under which the state identifies permissible 
land uses which will have a "direct and significant impact on the 
Pub. L. No. 104-4,109 Stat. 48. See infra Section IV and Conclusion. 
210 See LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE § 1.01 (1991). 
211 See 480 U.S. 572, 587 (1987). 
212 [d. 
213 MALONE, supra note 210, at §§ 1.02, 2.01. 
214 [d. at xi. 
215 See 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1). A state program shall give "full consideration to ecological, cultural, 
historic, and esthetic [sic] values as well as the needs for compatible economic development .... " 
[d. § 1452(2). 
216 See Oliver A. Houck and Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consid-
eration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs To The States, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1242, 1289 (1995); Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464. 
217 See Houck & Rolland, supra note 216, at 1294. 
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coastal waters."218 The state must also develop means by which the 
state will exert control, and guidelines on how the state will prioritize 
land and water uses in affected areas. Under the CZMA, the federal 
government does not provide criteria for determining development 
outcomes but provides only a review of the process.219 By participat-
ing in coastal zone planning, the states also subject federal lands and 
federal projects to a review for consistency with state programs, 
activities which would otherwise by preempted.220 Importantly, states 
retain authority for making basic land-use policy choices.221 Whatever 
use is made of the land, the use continues to be subject to all environ-
mental permitting and other requirements. 
"Environmental federalism" describes the federal-state relationship 
in protecting the environment. As commentators have observed, the 
strong federal role now played by EPA occurred because of the 
states' failure to address environmental problems satisfactorily.222 By 
establishing uniform standards, states would be prevented from 
"harmful competition" with each other to attract polluting indus-
tries.223 Federal regulation would also address transboundary pollu-
tion problems.224 
The federal government currently uses three general approaches 
to environmental federalism.225 The first approach is to "provide finan-
cial or regulatory incentives which encourage states to adopt environ-
mental standards on their own."226 This model continues to be used 
218 I d. at 1295. 
219Id. 
220 Id. at 1297. 
221 See id. at 1298. States have implemented the CZMA with widely varied outcomes. Id. Some 
states have passed set-back ordinances and other land-use restrictions or even banned industrial 
development. Id. Other states have continued to facilitate condominium development projects 
or other uses along the coast, denying very few uses. Id. 
222 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary 
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1160 (1995). 
2Zl This theme of preventing harmful competition, also known as a race-to-the-bottom, is 
repeated in most justifications for allowing the federal government to regulate where the states 
have failed to do so. See generally Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). For a 
view of how this rationale continues to influence environmental regulation, see David R. Rodas, 
Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be A 
Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared By The United States, The States, and Their 
Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1615 (1995). 
224 Rouck & Rolland, supra note 216, at 1246 (noting that in passing the Clean Water Act and 
its amendments, Congress recognized that virtually all Americans live downstream). 
225 Percival, supra note 222, at 1173. 
226Id. 
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where environmental regulation most affects land-use regulation, such 
as under the Coastal Zone Management Act.227 
The second and most prominent model for environmental federal-
ism is that of cooperative federalism.228 States may assume responsi-
bility for administering and enforcing the environmental program 
once their state program is determined by EPA to be capable of 
meeting minimum federal standards.229 This approach is used in the 
Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Safe Drinking Water Act.230 A pro-
gram of cooperative federalism should: "(1) provide for state imple-
mentation; (2) set clear standards; (3) reflect respect for state auton-
omy; (4) provide mechanisms to police the process; and (5) apply the 
same rules to government and private parties."231 This model has 
been successfully used in delegating permitting authority under the 
Clean Water Act's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) regulations, for example.232 
A third approach to environmental federalism favors federal pre-
emption of inconsistent state standards and federal contro1.233 The 
Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) and Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) use this approach, as do the Clean 
Air Act's vehicle emissions standards.234 CERCLA's ARAR process 
preempts state environmental permitting requirements but incorpo-
rates state substantive standards.235 States retain limited authority to 
227 [d. 
228 [d. at 1174. 
229 [d. 
230 Clean Air Act, 42 u.s.c. §§ 7401-7626 (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 u.s.c. §§ 1251-1387 
(1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (1994); Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1994). 
231 Babich, supra note 100, at 1534 (discussing cooperative federalism in the context of haz-
ardous waste management and cleanup). 
232 Houck & Rolland, supra note 216, at 1289; see Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. 
233 Percival, supra note 222, at 1176. 
234 [d. 
235 When states attempted to control federal discretion by independently enforcing state 
standards at Superfund sites, EPA asserted a right to preempt state environmental laws in the 
1985 NCP. EPA's general counsel had advised then EPA administrator, Lee M. Thomas, that 
CERCLA impliedly preempted all otherwise applicable state and federal environmental laws. 
Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, EPA General Counsel to Lee M. Thomas, EPA Adminis-
trator, CERCLA Compliance with Other Environmental Laws, General Counsel Opinion (Nov. 
22,1995), available in LEXIS, ENVIRN Library, ALLEPA File. Several states appealed EPA's 
assertion of authority in the NCP, an action Congress mooted with the 1986 reauthorization. 
See, e.g., Ohio v. EPA, No. 86-1096 (D.C. Cir. filed 1986). When CERCLA was amended, SARA 
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enforce state standards under authority of state law.236 CERCLA's 
liability provisions specifically do not preempt state statutory or com-
mon law actions.237 
Because of the overlap in environmental regulation and land-use 
regulation, federal environmental regulation may preempt not only 
state environmental regulation but also state land-use regulation. 
This is not popular and Congress has sought to avoid the appearance 
of regulating land use, if not the result.238 Although the federal gov-
ernment's authority to regulate interstate commerce or spend for the 
general welfare may preempt certain state land-use regulation when 
there is a conflict, the real property interests are still defined by state 
law.239 Those advancing the idea of greater federal government control 
over land use have recognized that direct regulation is not required 
if the government simply acquires an interest in the land.240 At one 
end, the federal government can be a holder of the property interest 
like any other, through the exchange of mutual covenants similar to 
any contractual obligation. At the other extreme, the federal govern-
ment acquires preemptive regulatory powers over the land by acquir-
ing the property interest.241 
rejected such an intention by requiring that cleanups meet all applicable or otherwise relevant 
and appropriate state and federal standards (now ARARs). SARA § 121(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9621. 
EPA is thus required to incorporate state standards into the remedial action plan as part of the 
ARAR process. Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1526-27 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Babich, supra 
note 100, at 1536. The D.C. Circuit upheld EPA's interpretation that the ARAR requirement 
means compliance with the substantive requirements of federal and state laws and not the 
procedural requirements of those same laws. Ohio, 997 F.2d at 1527. 
236 See Babich, supra note 100, at 1536-37. 
237 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a). 
238 See Jordan, supra note 5, at 403. 
239 Id.; see Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1,20 (1990) (traditional takings doctrine looks to state 
property law to see what property interests are burdened by preemptive ICC regulations) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (interest 
in trade secret property rights determined under state law to determine preemptive effect of 
EPA regulations). 
240 Jordan, supra note 5, passim. This idea of regulation by purchase is not novel and was 
raised by the Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1954) (noting police power 
authority of District of Columbia to redevelop blighted areas by taking full or partial fee, as 
needed). 
241 Even though purchased pursuant to the commerce or spending power, if retained by the 
federal government, the easement would be subject to the federal government's property power. 
Federal lands may be managed pursuant to the Article I property power for federal enclaves 
over which the national government has exclusive jurisdiction, or the Article IV property power 
for those federal lands that remain subject to the jurisdiction of the state government as well 
as the federal government. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
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Pursuant to the Article IV property power, Congress has both 
legislative and proprietary powers, and may make all "needful rules 
and regulations" respecting federallands.242 Thus, in Kleppe v. New 
Mexico,243 the federal Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, 
enacted to protect unclaimed horses and burros on public lands, could 
preempt state laws that allowed their capture when the animals strayed 
from public lands.244 This was not an impermissible intrusion into state 
sovereignty in an area traditionally regulated by the state "but the 
necessary consequence of valid legislation under the Property Clause."245 
Commentators do not agree on the extent to which the exercise of the 
property power preempts state and local laws, if at a11.246 Many believe 
Kleppe was wrongly decided.247 
The federal government currently owns more than one-third of the 
lands in the United States.248 At one time, public land laws were laws 
242Id. at art. IV, §3, cl. 2. The Article IV Property Clause provides: "The Congress shall have 
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or 
other Property belonging to the United States .... " Id. 
243 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976). 
244Id. 
245 Id. at 545. The decision applied to actions ofthe New Mexico Livestock Board who entered 
public lands to remove the wild burros. See id. at 546. The Court did not decide whether the 
Act could be sustained in all applications. See id. 
246 See generally Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. 
L. REV. 617 (1985). Although the Supreme Court has recently viewed the property power 
broadly, critics of this view assert that Congress has only the power of an ordinary proprietor 
under its Article IV powers and there is no preemptive capability. Some classic theorists argue 
that Congress has no authority to retain ownership of lands within the states at all. See id. at 
619. These theorists recognize two exceptions from the case law. First, congressional action 
under the Article IV property power may have preemptive effect when Congress acts solely to 
control title upon disposition of Article IV lands. Id. at 651-2; Second, Congress may act to 
protect federal lands from harm. Id. at 652. Classic theorists would also agree that the property 
power can be used to effectuate an enumerated power, believing that the Article IV property 
power is not itself an enumerated power. Id. at 651 n.223. Although the Kleppe Court stated 
that the Article IV power is "without limitations," even those who agree with a broader view 
of the property power would find limitations on the power. In particular, the "needfulness" of 
the regulation is a constitutional limitation of the use the power. Id. at 656 n.252 (citing Light 
v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911)). Other Supreme Court cases recognizing limitations 
include Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 677-88 (1979) (assertion of easement across 
private land to reach federal lands not authorized); Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 230 (1925) 
(rights of states over roads in national park are unaffected by federal Act creating the park); 
Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911) (property clause regulation interfering with private 
property constituted a taking). 
247 Classic theorists believe Kleppe broke with established case precedent as well as with the 
Framers' intent in drafting the Constitutional provisions. Gaetke, supra note 246, at 619. 
248 DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 9 (2d ed. 1994) (citing 
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STA-
TISTICS 1980 (1981) (stating that the federal government owns approximately 740 million acres 
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"governing the alienation of the public land," providing the means 
through which minerals and lands were conveyed to private inter-
ests.249 Certain lands were "reserved" for public interests such as 
national forests, wildlife refuges, and the national monuments.250 The 
Bureau of Land Management manages those public lands not re-
served for special purposes.251 The Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act (FLPMA), passed in 1976, represented a shift from this 
policy of disposition to one of retention, providing that "the public 
lands [should] be retained in Federal ownership, unless as a result of 
land-use planning procedure provided for in this Act, it is deter-
mined that the disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national 
interest."252 
More recently, federal legislation has provided for acquisition of 
property and creation of easements, primarily for conservation and 
preservation programs.253 These easements have been referred to as 
federal land use restriction easement or "L DRES."254 Among the 
federal programs are the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP)/55 the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP),256 the Environmental Ease-
of land in the United States of which approximately 440 million are "disposable" administra-
tively, without congressional approval». 
249 See Marla E. Mansfield, "A New Erafor the Western Public Lands:" When "Private" Rights 
Meet "Public" Rights: The Problems of Labeling and Regulatory Takings, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 
193,196 & n.15 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 19 (1965». 
250 Id. at 197. 
251Id. at 198-99. 
252 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(I); Mansfield, supra note 249, at 199-200. 
253 See Jordan, supra note 5, at 412-23. 
254 Id. at 406 & n.23. 
255 The Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) was created with the 1990 Farm bill. See Conser-
vation Program Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101--624, § 1237(a), 104 Stat. 3359, 
amending subtitle D of Title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198 (codified 
at 16 U.S.C. § 3837(a) (1994». The WRP falls under the umbrella of the Environmental Conser-
vation Acreage Reserve Program (ECARP) along with the CRP program and the Environ-
mental Easement Program, among others. Linda A. Malone, Reflections on the Jeffersonian 
Ideal of an Agrarian Democracy and the Emergence of an Agricultural and Environmental 
Ethic in the 1990 Farm bill, 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 40 (1993). To participate in the Wetlands 
Reserve Program, the property owner must grant an easement to the Secretary of Agriculture 
with a recorded deed restriction that will preserve the wetland values of the property. Malone, 
supra, at 41; 16 U.S.C. § 3837a(a). The term of the easement must be for at least 30 years or 
the maximum allowed under state law. 16 U.S.C. § 3837a(e). Under the implementing regula-
tions, the agency expressed a preference for permanent easements and, initially, would accept 
only permanent easements. 
256 As originally enacted, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was designed to take 
highly erodible land out of agricultural production and into a reserve to directly control the 
erosion. Malone, supra note 255, at 18--19. See Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 
§§ 1221-1236 (1985), codified as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-23, 3831-36 (1994). As amended by 
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ment Program (EEP),257 the Forest Legacy Program/58 the FmHA 
Debt Cancellation Conservation Easement Program,259 and the Wa-
the 1990 Farm bill, the CRP program has been extended to other types of environmentally 
sensitive land. Malone, supra note 255, at 19; see Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1231 (codified as amended 
at 16 U.S.C. § 3831(b». The provisions become binding through the use of contractual provisions 
rather than by creating interests in land; however, lands subject to certain useful life easements 
may be eligible to be included in the CRP program. Malone, supra note 255, at 24; 7 C.F.R. 
§ 1410 (1995). To put eligible land into the conservation reserve, the owner must contractually 
agree to: (1) apply an approved conservation plan removing the land from commodity production 
for a less intensive use; (2) place the land in the reserve; (3) not use the land for agricultural 
purposes, except as permitted by the Secretary; (4) establish approved vegetative cover or 
watercover on the land; (5) forfeit the right to receive rental and cost sharing payments, refund 
all payments received plus interest for a violation of the contract warranting termination, and 
refund or accept adjustments to the rental and cost sharing payments for any violations not 
warranting termination of the contract; (6) forfeit the right to receive rental and cost sharing 
payments, refund such payments as the Secretary considers appropriate upon transfer of the 
land, subject to the contract, unless the transferee agrees to assume the contract or the 
Secretary and the transferee agree to modifications of the contract; (7) not conduct harvesting, 
grazing or commercial use of forage except as permitted by the Secretary; (8) not make 
commercial use of trees, unless expressly permitted in the contract; (9) not adopt any practice 
specified by the Secretary in the contract as a practice which would tend to defeat the purposes 
of the program; (10) comply with any additional requirements the Secretary might include in 
the contract; and (11) under a 1990 amendment, not produce an agricultural commodity on any 
other highly erodible land purchased after November 28,1990 that has not been used to produce 
an agricultural commodity other than forage crops. Malone, supra note 255, at 21-22 (citations 
omitted). Participants are also subject to additional regulatory provisions that are incorporated 
by reference as a contract condition. [d. at 28-29; 7 C.F.R. § 1410. The contracts are for terms 
from 10 to 15 years and, if the land under contract is transferred, the new owner may assume 
the contractual obligations, enter a new contract, or elect not to participate. Malone, supra note 
254, at 23. 
257 The Secretary of Agriculture has authority under the Environmental Easement Program 
(EEP) to acquire easements on land enrolled in the CRP program or other cropland that is 
environmentally sensitive. 16 U.S.C. § 3839(b)(I). Under the EEP, the easements must be 
permanent or for the maximum duration permitted under state law. [d. § 3839(a). The owner 
has affirmative obligations under the EEP to develop and carry out a natural resources conser-
vation management plan. The easement management plan may prohibit certain commercial or 
other uses or provide for the permanent retirement of cropland base. [d. § 3839a(b); see Malone, 
supra note 255, at 44. 
258 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(a). The Forest Legacy Program, also part of the 1990 Farm bill, author-
izes the United States Forest Service (USFS) to use conservation easements and other mecha-
nisms to protect and conserve forest areas. [d. Under the Legacy Program, only the USFS may 
hold title to these interests. [d. § 2103c(c). The easement must specify the environmental values 
the USFS seeks to protect, the types of activities landowners will conduct, and the effects those 
activities will have on the land. [d. § 2103c(d). The Legacy Program requires state government 
consent before the USFS can acquire an easement within the state's borders. [d. § 2103c(g); see 
Laura S. Beliveau, The Forest Legacy Program: Using Conservation Easements to Preserve 
the Northern Forest, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 507, 513-21 (1993). 
259 The 1985 Farm bill authorized the Secretary to acquire LUREs as a means of debt 
restructuring on Farmers Home Association (FmHA) loans. 7 U.S.C. § 1997(b) (1994). If the 
realty is secured by a FmHA loan, a farmer may be eligible for a write-down of the debt in 
exchange for granting an easement for not less than 50 years to the federal government. [d. 
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tershed Protection Program.260 When similar regulation would effect 
a taking, the cost of paying for an easement is equivalent to paying 
just compensation.261 
Most of these existing programs are voluntary. Prior to passage of 
the 1985 Farm bill, the Iowa Natural Heritage Foundation studied 
the use of conservation easements in the federal agricultural pro-
grams.262 The Agricultural Land Trust (ALT) was an attempt to com-
bine the goals of agricultural conservation with credit relief for farm-
ers.263 The program was thought to be attractive because the 
easements would be obtained through voluntary arm's length nego-
tiation and bargaining which would be less oppressive than regulatory 
restrictions or the use of eminent domain.264 The federal government 
is more likely to use their power of eminent domain to condemn an 
interest under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act265 or the Trails 
Act.266 
The property power itself does not authorize the acquisition of 
property, however, federal property interests acquired under LURE 
§ 1997(e). The 1990 Farm bill expanded the scope of the FmHA easement. Jordan, supra note 
5, at 416. Initially available only to borrowers who had defaulted on their payments, this 
provision may now be used any time it "better enables a qualified borrower to repay the loan 
in a timely manner." See id. at 416; 7 U.S.C. § 1997(c)(3)(A)(ii). Although the decision to exchange 
an easement for debt write-down is left to the borrower in most cases, the FmHA is now 
required to impose a perpetual easement on wetlands in inventoried property. 7 U.S.C. 
§ 1985(g)(1); Jordan, supra note 5, at 417 nn.88-89 and accompanying text. 
260 The Watershed Protection Program (Watershed Program) was created in 1954 to protect 
and improve the nation's land and water resources. Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention 
Act, Pub. L. No. 83-566, § 1,68 Stat. 666, 666 (1954) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1001 
(1994)). The 1990 Farm bill expanded the Watershed Program by authorizing cost-sharing for 
perpetual LUREs on wetlands or floodplains to perpetuate, restore, and enhance the natural 
capabilities of land and water resources. 16 U.S.C. § 1003a(a); see Jordan, supra note 5, at 421. 
Like easements acquired under Section 104(j), the Watershed Program provides that the 
easement be held by the states rather than the federal government. Jordan, supra note 5, at 
421. 
261 Jordan, supra note 5, at 434. 
262 See generally Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Authority for Federal Acquisition of Conservation 
Easements to Provide Agricultural Credit Relief, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 477 (1985/1986) (reviewing 
the proposed Agricultural Land Trust that was subsequently used as a basis for the debt 
restructuring provisions of the 1985 Farm bill). 
263 [d. at 484. 
264 [d. at 486. 
265 The Migratory Bird Conservation Act authorizes the federal government to acquire areas 
of land and water suitable for migratory waterfowl, or the "interests therein." 16 U .S.C. §§ 715a, 
715d (1994). 
266 The National Trails System Act (Trails Act) authorized conversion of unused railroad 
rights-of-way to recreational trails. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1242-46 (1994). Private lands may be obtained 
through condemnation if voluntary means fail. [d. § 1246(g). 
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acquisition programs fall within the scope of Article IV if the federal 
government retains the interest acquired.267 The property power has 
been applied to dispositions of partial interests in land including min-
eralleases, energy and transmission lines.268 Federal regulations "re-
specting" federal lands may preempt state and local laws.269 It has 
been urged that the federal government can and should, pursuant to 
the property power, acquire conservation and preservation easements 
in perpetuity even when the right to do so does not exist under 
state law.270 Although the dicta in Kleppe would indicate the property 
power could be used to preempt state law, the more recent concern 
of the Supreme Court in preserving the structure of the federal 
system would indicate a more narrow construction is likely.271 It is a 
factor in the equation nonetheless, because "[ w ]hen one undertakes 
to develop for private purposes a project involving the use of lands 
encumbered by a government interest, one's expectations are, or 
should be, that a certain amount of process and expense will be 
involved .... "272 
267 See Jordan, supra note 5, at 454 (recognizing that the general language of Article IV 
Property Clause encompasses all property owned by United States, including personalty and 
intangible property as well as interests in realty). 
268 See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 330 (1936). This is one of the 
recognized exceptions even under the classic view of the property power. Gaetke, supra note 
246, at 651-52. 
269 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541-46 (1976); see Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 
518, 525-26 (1897). Classic theorists would limit this exception to nuisance-like actions. Gaetke, 
supra note 246, at 653. 
270 Jordan, supra note 5, at 465-70. Although acquisition of federal easements may be author-
ized under the commerce power for various conservation and preservation purposes, Professor 
Jordan would use the spending power in combination with the property power to transform the 
interest acquired. [d. at 470. She argues that legislation conditioning the availability of federal 
funds in exchange for a LURE on terms requiring the LURE to be perpetual is a conditional 
offer of federal funds within Congress's spending power. [d. at 443. Further, in cases where the 
federal government is the holder, the LURE creates enforceable rights in the federal govern-
ment. Legislation authorizing the LURE is analogous to a rule respecting property interests 
belonging to the United States and is a means within Congress's property power. Therefore, 
the federal legislation can be characterized as an exercise of the spending power for the general 
welfare and as an exercise of the property power to create enforceable rights protecting the 
federal interest in conservation. [d. at 443-44. 
271 See supra Section IV. 
272 Friends of the Shawangunks v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446, 452 (2d Cir. 1985). Although not decided 
under the property power, Friends of the Shawangunks was a dispute over a proposed amend-
ment to a conservation easement acquired by the National Park Service (Secretary of the 
Interior) pursuant to the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 
to 4601-11 (1994). Under the terms of the easement, the fee owner was not allowed to develop 
or erect new facilities, alter the landscape or terrain, or cut trees, but could operate, maintain 
and reconstruct existing facilities within the easement area, including buildings, roads, utilities 
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Although lands subject to a federal easement are still considered 
private as opposed to public lands, the federal interest in the land opens 
the door to assertions of additional public rights in the property.273 For 
this reason, landowners have been reluctant to sell easements to the 
federal government under the Forest Legacy Program, fearing that 
future use of the land will implicate the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA)274 or the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).275 As 
with other conservation easements, these easements have a decidedly 
public nature.276 
At the heart of many land-use conflicts is whether or to what extent 
there are "societal rights" over private land.277 This debate exists 
whether or not an interest in the property has been conveyed, and is 
central to understanding current initiatives for increased community 
participation in remediation and permitting decisions.278 
and golf courses. Friends of the Shawangunks, 754 F.2d at 448. Marriott, the fee owner, proposed 
to amend the easement to allow construction of a resort facility including a hotel, condominium 
units, ski facilities, and a golf course. I d. About one-half the development (239 acres) was covered 
by the existing easement. ld. In exchange for the amendment, Marriott would extend the area 
of the easement and limit development on adjacent property as well as open a portion of the 
facilities to the public. ld. at 449. Although the Park Service determined that a "conversion" 
would not occur because the public had no current access to the easement area and agreed to 
the amendment, a state non-profit group opposed the development. ld. In interpreting the 
statute, the appellate court ruled that the statutory term "public outdoor recreation uses" 
encompassed not only uses involving the public's physical presence on the property but also 
their interest in maintaining the scenic vistas and the buffer zone between the state park and 
developed areas. ld. at 450. In finding that the amendment would be a conversion under the 
statute, the Secretary of the Interior was thus required to "determine that the conversion is 
'in accord with the then existing comprehensive statewide outdoor recreation plan' and grant 
his approval 'only upon such conditions as he deems necessary to assure the substitution of other 
recreation properties of at least equal fair market value and of reasonably equivalent usefulness 
and location.'" ld. at 451. 
273 Generally, the term "public lands" is applied to lands managed by the federal Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM). 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1994); see Mansfield, supra note 249, at 198-99. 
Professor Mansfield discusses "public lands" as well as those lands federally owned and acces-
sible to the public, such as national parks, national forests, and national wildlife refuges, and 
how to resolve conflicts between traditional private property rights and "collective or non-con-
sumptive" rights. ld. 
274 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544. 
275 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370; see Beliveau, supra note 258, at 526. Generally, NEPA is triggered 
when there is a federal action, i.e., a federal program or federal funding. EPA actions, including 
those taken under CERCLA, are generally not subject to NEPA as such. Instead, EPA is 
obligated to consider the same environmental values in carrying out all of the programs dele-
gated to the agency. 
276 See supra Section IILA. 
277 See Jordan, supra note 5, at 426-30, (discussing Professor Caldwell's theory of property 
which would impose obligations of stewardship on landowners not present under common law 
principles of private land ownership). 
278 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
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Some suggest that our notion of private property has become out-
dated and does not appropriately recognize non-developmental rights 
in the property.279 The idea of a land ethic was championed years ago 
by Aldo Leopold280 who mourned the loss of species and ecosystems 
to unchecked development and resource exploitation. He urged upon 
Americans a greater sensitivity to the cycles of nature and a respect 
for the land, and his influence has led to a dedication of economic 
resources to conservation and preservation values.281 Societal inter-
ests are much broader than environmental interests, and presumably 
include any public purpose. The concept is incorporated into the broad 
grant of authority under Section 104(k). EPA's Land Use Directive 
and Prospective Purchaser Policy imply as much, extending the fu-
ture use determination to include considerations for mass transit, 
revitalization of the inner city, infrastructure improvements, environ-
mental justice, and more.282 
The notion of societal interests in private property is inconsistent 
with the protections of private property provided in the Fifth Amend-
ment. The public interest is accounted for in the concept of eminent 
domain and in the police powers of the states to regulate for the 
safety, health, and welfare ofthe community.283 Attaching an unnamed 
and global "societal interest" to an interest in property amounts to a 
plenary grant of authority that circumvents the legislative process 
and the requirement to identify a substantial government interest in 
a particular activity as well as a nexus between the governmental 
action and the means employed. When the grantee is the federal 
government, the constitutional structure may be redefined by a public 
purpose that is too broad. 
Other proponents of greater federal control speak of protecting 
"federal interests."284 Through citizen suits or other provisions pro-
279Id. Concerns for social rights in environmentally important land dictate looking to the 
future, and requiring managed land use to preserve for the future, rather than for the highest 
and best use of the land for the present. See Jordan, supra note 5, at 427 (citing Lynton K. 
Caldwell, Land and the Law: Problems in Legal Philosophy, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 323 
(1986». 
280 See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, WITH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM 
ROUND RIVER (1966). 
281 See supra Section lILA. 
282 See supra text accompanying notes 126--27. 
283 A public purpose may include preservation and protection of aesthetic values as well. 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954). The rationale for just compensation under the 
Takings Clause is that an individual should not bear the entire burden for what is intended to 
benefit the public at large. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Increasingly, a 
taking will be found when a regulation goes too far. 
2t\! Mansfield, supra note 249, at 225-26. 
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viding for federal approval of state environmental programs, state 
policy choices are being challenged as inconsistent with federal law 
for this reason. In some cases, the result of these suits is a modification 
of state property law. In Virginia, for example, the state program to 
administer the Clean Air Act's Title V operating permits was recently 
disapproved based on the differences in judicial review of permitting 
decisions under state law.285 Under Virginia law, members of the pub-
lic are only aggrieved by a permitting decision, for the purpose of 
seeking judicial review, if they suffer an invasion of an "immediate, 
legally protected, pecuniary and substantial interest .... "286 This was 
determined to be violative of the Clean Air Act because it was more 
restrictive than Article III standing, which would grant standing to 
someone with injury to health, aesthetic, environmental, or recrea-
tional interests.287 In this way, protection of the federal interest modifies 
rights and remedies under state property law by attaching public 
rights to the use of private property. 
But what is the federal interest at stake? It is difficult to imagine 
that federal interests could be anything more than or apart from those 
values that are incorporated into our constitutional structure. Thus, 
the federal system should protect federal interests by operation of the 
Supremacy Clause but should not protect any interests that would 
define federal interests at the expense of the federal system. 
The importance of the underlying constitutional structure in limit-
ing the scope of federal authority was central to the Court's recent 
decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.288 In Seminole Tribe, 
the Court found that Congress lacked the power to abrogate the 
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Indian Commerce 
Clause.289 In so ruling, they overturned their earlier decision in Penn-
285 See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 870 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding EPA decision). Similarly, 
in Texas, the EPA gave only interim approval to the state to administer the Title V operating 
permits program under the Clean Air Act, questioning whether the immunity provisions of the 
Texas Audit Privilege Act may interfere with the state's authority to administer the program. 
See 61 Fed. Reg. 32,693, 32,697 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70) (proposed June 25, 
1996). In a letter from EPA Region VI Administrator, Jane Saginaw, to the Texas Natural 
Resource Conservation Commission, EPA indicated its intent to review the state's underground 
injection control program and NPDES authority in light of the Texas Environmental, Health 
and Safety Audit Privilege Act, codified at TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc (West 1996), 
as well as the Texas Takings Act, codified at 10 TEx. GOv'T. CODE ANN. ch. 2007 (West 1996), 
and certain public participation provisions of the Texas Water Code, TEx. WATER CODE ANN. 
§ 5.115 (West 1996). 
286 Browner, 80 F.3d at 876. 
287 See id. at 876-79. 
288116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996), overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
289 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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sylvania v. Union Gas upholding Article I authority under CERCLA 
to waive state sovereign immunity from suits for money damages.29o 
On the one hand, the Seminole decision-and others that will be 
discussed in the following section-restores power to the states by 
reaffirming limits on Congress's authority to regulate. At the same 
time-perhaps in response-federal regulatory power is being as-
serted in bold new ways. In addition to the exercise of federal power 
over land use that accompanies environmental controls in general, 
EPA is placing new and additional conditions on the initial delegation 
of federal programs to the states. The federal government also is 
regulating by purchase through provisions such as that proposed for 
hazardous substance easements under CERCLA. 
With the broad public nature of the easement interest that could 
be acquired pursuant to Section 104(k), preemption begins to run 
afoul of the Tenth Amendment. 
IV. PROPOSED SECTION 104(K) WOULD COMMANDEER THE STATE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND IS THUS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS 
FACE 
With its broad public purpose and the authority it conveys, pro-
posed Section 104(k) would effect a transformation of the property 
interest that would normally be conveyed to the EPA for Superfund's 
environmental purposes (for access and to assure the effectiveness of 
the Superfund remedy) into a federal right in the property to regulate 
the use and disposition of land into the future. I submit this new 
purpose is not allowable under the commerce power nor related to 
Congress's exercise of the spending power. Its effect is to comman-
deer the legislative process of the states in contravention of the Tenth 
Amendment. 
Initially, we must determine whether Section 104(k) is allowable 
under the Commerce Clause.291 If the answer is no, then federal law 
may not preempt state law.292 Even so, Congress may still be able to 
290 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128. Under CERCLA, "states" are included within the 
statutory definition of "persons" who may be liable for cleanup. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994). 
Section 9601(20)(D) provides that "such a state or local government shall be subject to the 
provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent ... as any nongovern-
mental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title." Id. § 9601(20)(D). The Court 
in Union Gas had determined that, because this language mirrored the language of Section 
120(a)(1), waiving the federal government's immunity from suit, Congress had intended to 
likewise waive the states' immunity. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 10. 
291 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
292 But see discussion of preemption under the federal property power, supra Section III.C. 
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exercise its spending power to indirectly condition the use of federal 
funds.293 This is an independent inquiry.294 The conditions imposed 
under the spending power must be (1) for the general welfare, (2) 
unambiguous, (3) reasonably related to the federal purpose, and (4) 
not prohibited by an independent constitutional bar.295 
Principals of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment con-
strain the legitimacy of Congressional authority pursuant to the com-
merce power.296 The fact that the states are given no way to avoid 
Section 104(k)'s reach is apparent when looking at the preemptive 
effect the provision would have. Congress may not "use the States as 
implements of regulation" by demanding that states regulate or leg-
islate in a particular manner.297 Congress, however, may finance such 
regulation itself as a federal program or provide a choice to the states 
to adopt the federal program.298 The Tenth Amendment also protects 
against coercive use of the spending power.299 
If Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regu-
late land use in the manner proposed by Section 104(k), then it has 
the authority to displace state laws since federal law is supreme. A 
statute that is permissible under the Commerce Clause and the spending 
clause may still be unconstitutional on its face. In the land-use con-
text, the government may not condition the exercise of a constitu-
tional right unless the condition survives strict scrutiny.30o The inquiry 
must establish an essential nexus between the condition and the 
legislative purpose that is roughly proportional in both nature and 
degree.30l 
A. The Madisonian Dilemma 
This question presents a classic "Madisonian dilemma,"302 which is 
the tension between democratic authority and individual liberty, and 
how the Constitution reconciles these competing principles through 
293 See infra Section IV.E. 
294 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,65-70 (1936). 
295 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987). 
296 U.S. CaNST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people." Id. 
297 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992); see also infra Section IV.A. 
29H New York, 505 U.S. at 167. 
299 See infra Section IY.E. 
300 See infra Section IV.D. 
:lOIId. 
302 See ROBERT H. BaRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 6, 139--41 (1990). 
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its definition of governmental structure, competence, and authority.303 
Recently, the importance of the underlying constitutional structure 
and the role of dual federal and state sovereigns has been reempha-
sized in our jurisprudence.304 
It is precisely this issue that confronted the Supreme Court in New 
York v. United States.305 In reviewing the constitutionality of the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, the 
Court addressed the proper division of authority between the federal 
government and the states.306 Under the 1985 Act, Congress imposed 
upon the states an obligation to provide for disposal of waste within 
their borders, and offered three statutory incentives to compliance: 
(1) monetary incentives under which a portion of surcharges received 
by states currently operating disposal sites would be put into an 
escrow fund for disbursement to states that met statutory deadlines; 
(2) access incentives that denied access to disposal sites in other states 
when the statutory deadlines were not met; and (3) a take-title pro-
vision requiring states that failed to provide for disposal of locally-
generated wastes to take title to and possession of the waste. The 
Court upheld the exercise of congressional authority where the stat-
ute provided the states with choices to accept monetary incentives 
and access incentives in return for regulating in a certain manner 
when the exercise was within Congress's commerce and spending 
powers. The Court found the take title provisions of the Act to be a 
choice between two unconstitutionally coercive alternatives outside 
of Congress's enumerated powers and inconsistent with the Tenth 
Amendment.307 
In determining the division of authority between the federal gov-
ernment and the states, the Court stated that whether Congress has 
been delegated authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause and 
:303 Id. Structural elements in the Constitution include separation of powers, checks and 
balances, judicial review, and federalism. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1637 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). With the first three elements, the standards are clear and well 
accepted, but with federalism, the role of the Court has been less clear. Id. The Court's 
"institutional capacity to intervene" is more in doubt in Commerce Clause matters because of 
the "substantial element of political judgment" in those issues. Id. at 1640. 
304 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-32 (1996) (finding Congress 
lacked power to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Indian Commerce 
Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (invalidating take-title provision 
of regulation in contravention of Tenth Amendment reservation of powers to states). 
305 505 U.S. at 144. 
306 Id. at 149. 
:107 Id. at 174-77. 
322 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:2 
whether Congress has invaded the province of the states under the 
Tenth Amendment are questions that are "mirror images" of each 
other.308 The Tenth Amendment analysis was, thus, whether an inci-
dent of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I 
power.309 
In New York, the Court was concerned that Congress was using 
the states as "implements of regulation," commanding the states to 
accept federally-mandated choices.310 The Court distinguished these 
coercive actions from valid means to encourage states to act in a 
particular way. First of all, under the spending power, Congress may 
attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, provided the condi-
tions meet the four criteria set out in South Dakota v. Dole.311 Second, 
where Congress has Commerce Clause authority, it may provide the 
states with the choice of (1) regulating the activity according to fed-
eral standards, or (2) having state law preempted by federal regula-
tion.312 With these and other permissible methods, the "residents of 
the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State 
will comply."313 
The Court upheld the monetary and access incentives of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act as permissible means 
of encouraging state compliance.314 The take-title provision of the Act, 
however, offered coercion rather than encouragement and was thus 
an unconstitutional intrusion on state sovereignty.315 This provision 
offered a choice to the states of either accepting ownership of the 
radioactive waste or regulating according to the instructions of Con-
gress.316 In this instance, Congress had neither the authority to re-
quire transfer of the waste (and the associated liability) from the 
generator to the state, nor the authority to direct the states to regu-
308 Id. at 155-56. 
309 Id. at 157. 
310 New York, 505 U.S. at 157. 
311 Id. at 167 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987)). 
312Id. at 167...{i8. This Commerce Clause authority of "cooperative federalism" is the means 
employed to achieve the federal environmental and safety goals under various federal Acts. See 
supra Section IILC for a discussion of environmental federalism. 
313 New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
314Id. at 171-74. The first set of incentives (the monetary incentives) in which Congress 
conditioned grants to the states upon the attainment of several milestones was within congres-
sional authority under the Commerce and Spending Clauses. The second set of incentives (the 
access incentives) allowed the states to deny access to non-complying states. This was within 
Congress's authority to allow discrimination against interstate commerce. Id. 
315Id. at 174-77. 
316Id. 
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late. There was no threat that Congress could exercise either the 
commerce or spending power to require the states to either take title 
to radioactive waste or to regulate disposal of such waste. Therefore, 
they could not offer a choice between the twO.317 The Court in New 
York believed the take-title provision to be unique, having been re-
ferred to "no other federal statute ... which offers a state govern-
ment no option other than that of implementing legislation enacted 
by Congress."318 Section 104(k) offers a similarly coercive scheme 
under which the federal government would regulate by purchase. 
B. Commerce Clause Authority 
Courts have interpreted the federal government's authority to regu-
late under the Commerce Clause generously, but there are limitations 
on the federal power in areas where the states have historically 
been sovereign, such as education and criminal law enforcement.319 In 
United States v. Lopez, the United States Supreme Court found that 
Congress lacked authority to make the possession of a firearm in a 
school zone a federal offense.320 Lopez differed from the situation in 
New York "where the etiquette of federalism [had] been violated by 
a formal command from the National Government directing the State 
to enact a certain policy."321 The intrusion on state sovereignty was 
nonetheless significant absent a stronger connection with commercial 
concerns that would justify regulation under the Commerce Clause.322 
The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199()323 did not fall into any of 
the three broad categories of activities that Congress could regulate 
under its commerce power: (1) the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; or (3) 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.324 Jus-
tice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in Lopez, in which he ex-
plained and clarified the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence un-
der the third category of activities.325 The Court reemphasized that 
317 Id. at 176. 
318 Id. at 177. For a subsequent decision, see generally ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th 
Cir.1996). 
319 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995). 
320 I d. at 1626. 
321 Id. at 1642 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
322 Id. 
323 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(I)(A) (1994). 
324 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-32. 
325 I d. at 1624. 
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the test for determining whether an activity is within Congress's 
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause is whether it "substan-
tially affects" interstate commerce.326 This activity, mere possession 
of a firearm, was not an essential part of a larger regulation of eco-
nomic activity in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut 
unless the intrastate activity was regulated.327 The Lopez court dis-
tinguished possession of firearms from activities which do substan-
tially affect interstate commerce, such as the activities regulated by 
the statute upheld in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n.328 This citation to Hodel is significant because the federal 
mining regulations, which the Court noted with approval, had sur-
vived a Commerce Clause attack on the Act's alleged interference 
with local land-use decisions, also an area of traditional state sover-
eignty.329 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining involved a preenforce-
ment review of the constitutionality of the Surface Mining and Rec-
lamation Act of 1977.330 The stated purpose of the Act was to ensure 
that production of coal for interstate commerce would not be at the 
expense of agriculture, the environment, or public health and safety.33l 
The Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association ques-
tioned Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
land use, arguing that Congress could only regulate land use to the 
extent the Property Clause gave the federal government control over 
federallands.332 The Court rejected this framing of the issue.333 Based 
on the extensive legislative record reciting the damage associated 
with surface disturbance during mining operations, the Court found 
326 Id. at 1630 (admitting that recent case law had not been clear about whether activity must 
"affect" or "substantially affect" interstate commerce to fall within Congress's power to regu-
late). 
327Id. at 1631. 
328 Id. at 1631-34; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264, 269 (1981). 
329 See supra Section III. 
330 Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 268; Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 
1977 (Surface Mining Act), 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1994). 
331 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 (1981). Because the permanent regulations had not gone 
into effect, only the interim regulations of the Surface Mining Act's two-stage program were 
reviewed. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 273. The Act established interim performance 
standards governing: (a) restoration of land after mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration 
of land to its approximate original contour; (c) segregation and preservation of topsoil; (d) 
minimization of disturbance to the hydrologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine waste piles 
used as dams and embankments; (D revegetation of mined areas; and (g) spoil disposal. Id. at 
269. The Act also prohibited surface coal mining near churches, schools, parks, public buildings, 
and occupied dwellings. Indiana, 452 U.S. at 329. 
332 Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 275-76. 
333 Id. 
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that Congress rationally determined that regulation of surface coal 
mining is necessary to protect interstate commerce from adverse 
effects that may result from that activity.334 
In the companion case of Hodel v. Indiana, the Supreme Court 
separately upheld the prime farmland provisions of the Surface Min-
ing and Reclamation Act, again despite the Act's alleged interference 
with local land-use decisions.335 The Hodel v. Indiana Court refused 
to review separate facets of the regulatory program when the chal-
lenged provisions were an "integral part of a regulatory program" and 
the regulatory scheme considered as a whole was authorized under 
the Commerce Clause.336 
The Surface Mining Act, in the Court's opinion, was not a land-use 
measure similar to the zoning ordinances enacted by state and local 
government.337 The regulation of prime farmland and the restrictions 
on land use imposed by the Act were "temporary and incidental" to 
its primary purpose of regulating the conditions and effects of surface 
coal mining and did not extend to post-reclamation use.338 
Similarly, the authority given to EPA under Section 104G) of CER-
CLA to acquire property "needed to carry out remedial actions" 
would undoubtedly withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny as a tempo-
rary and incidental measure to effect Superfund's remediation goalS.339 
However, we have seen that Section 104(k),s public purpose is any-
thing but temporary and incidental. Section 104(k) would allow EPA 
to regulate land use and land-use planning well into the future. In-
stead of acquiring a property interest, the federal government would 
acquire regulatory power, displacing state and local authority in the 
process.340 Justice Rehnquist wrote separately in Hodel v. Virginia 
334 Id. at 281. 
335 Indiana, 452 U.S. at 335-36. Among these provisions were requirements that distinct soil 
layers on prime farmland be separately removed, segregated, stockpiled, and then properly 
replaced and regraded; that the mine operator show it can meet the soil reconstruction stand-
ards; that the operator demonstrate its technological capability to restore the mined area to 
equivalent or higher levels of yield; and that the operator's performance bond be released only 
upon a showing that such yields have been achieved. Id. at 319. 
336Id. at 329 n.17. The Supreme Court has been willing to look at components of a statute that 
are separable from the statutory scheme in reviewing their constitutionality. See New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186-87 (1992). 
337 Indiana, 452 U.S. at 330 n.18. 
338Id. 
339 But see United States v. Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1532-33 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (finding that, as 
applied, consent decree negotiated under CERCLA violated Commerce Clause, and questioning 
whether cleanup could be considered "economic" activity). 
340 See supra Sections II-III. 
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Surface Mining, concurring in the judgment but noting the misstate-
ment of the test used by the majority.341 To Rehnquist, and now a 
majority of the Court, "the law is not indifferent to considerations of 
degree."342 Proposed Section 104(k) is different enough in degree to 
be different in kind. 
One of the fatal aspects of the Gun-Free School Zones Act struck 
down in Lopez was the lack of a "jurisdictional element" to ensure, 
through case-by-case inquiry, that the illegal act in question affects 
interstate commerce.343 Section l04(k) is also flawed for this reason. 
Easements acquired under Section 104G) are subject to a case-by-
case inquiry as to whether they are actually "needed to conduct a 
remedial action."344 EPA's application of this authority could be uncon-
stitutional in a particular remedial action. The language of the statute 
provides both a standard to EPA in exercising its authority and the 
opportunity for those who would challenge it. As with a results-ori-
ented deed, there is an opportunity to say "no," in this case to agency 
action. 
There is no similar jurisdictional element in Section l04(k).345 The 
broad public purpose is aspirational and therefore standardless, re-
sulting in an impermissible delegation of authority to the executive 
branch and no measure for judicial review.346 There can thus be no 
assurance that on a case-by-case basis the property was acquired 
pursuant to a valid public purpose. The effect in this instance is 
analogous to the use of a reserved interest deed-all authority has 
been transferred. This is especially threatening to our constitutional 
values because, although the PRPs and the public have an opportu-
nity to comment on the remedial alternatives during the process, a 
remedy selection decision is not subject to pre-enforcement judicial 
review.347 With the exception of suits based on state law over which 
341 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264, 312 (1981). 
342 [d. at 310. 
343 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995). 
344 See supra Section III.A. 
340 See id. 
346 The analysis requiring a jurisdictional element in exercising the commerce power shares 
much in common with the non-delegation doctrine, which requires Congress to be specific in its 
delegation of power to an executive branch agency to maintain the separation of powers 
between the two branches of government. The Olin court was also concerned about improper 
delegation to the executive branch under CERCLA when it held that CERCLA could not be 
applied retroactively because Congress had not made its intent to do so sufficiently clear. See 
United States v. Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1520-21 (S.D. Ala. 1996). 
347 Section 113(h) withdraws federal jurisdiction to review Section 104 response actions or 106 
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standards are applicable or relevant and appropriate, parties cannot 
generally obtain court jurisdiction until the remedy is complete or EPA 
seeks to recover its costs or enforce a remedial order.348 If institutional 
controls are given in exchange for a covenant not to sue in a Brown-
fields redevelopment or de minimis contributor settlement, the set-
tling party also covenants not to sue EPA.349 There would thus be no 
judicial review at all. 
C. Preemption 
The prOVISIOns of Section 104(k) can be distinguished from the 
land-use regulation in Hodel for two reasons.350 First, the regulation 
in Hodel, like the provisions of Section 104G), fell within the Com-
merce Clause authority.35! Second, the residents of the states had a 
choice in that case to accept or reject the federal provisions.352 It is 
necessary to complete the commerce power inquiry by looking at the 
preemptive effect of Section 104(k). Again, the test is whether an 
incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article 
I power by the Tenth Amendment.353 
As the Court noted in New York v. United States, where Congress 
has Commerce Clause authority, they may preempt state law by 
federal regulation when the states choose not to adopt conforming 
regulations.354 This was, of course, the case in Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining, when the Court reaffirmed the power of Congress to 
displace state police power law by regulating private activity under 
the Commerce Clause:355 
abatement orders except in one of the following actions: (1) a Section 107 cost recovery action; 
(2) an action by the government under Section 106 to obtain injunctive relief or to enforce a 
Section 106(a) order; (3) an action by a PRP seeking cost reimbursement for compliance with 
an order under Section 106(b)(2); or (4) a Section 310 citi2en's suit challenging the terms of a 
response under Section 104 or a Section 106 order. CROWELL & MORING, supra note 22, at 5-53, 
5-54. 
348 [d. at 5-54. 
349 See Model Prospective Purchaser Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 34,797 (1995); Superfund 
Program, Revised Model De Minimis Contributor Consent Decree and Administrative Order 
on Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,849, 62,852-53 (1995). 
350 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 342 U.S. 264, 292 (1981). 
351 See id. 
352 See id. 
353 See supra Section IV.A. 
354 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1992). 
355 Virginia Suiface Mining, 452 U.S. at 292. 
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Congressional power over areas of private endeavor, even when 
its exercise may pre-empt express state-law determinations con-
trary to the result that has commended itself to the collective 
wisdom of Congress, has been held to be limited only by the 
requirement that "the means chosen by [Congress] must be rea-
sonably adapted to the end permitted by the constitution."356 
The Surface Mining & Reclamation Act was a "comprehensive statute 
designed to 'establish a nationwide program to protect society and the 
environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining opera-
tions."'357 Under the Act's interim program, a federal enforcement and 
inspection program was to be established for each State and was to 
remain in effect until a permanent program was implemented.358 Al-
though the states could issue surface mining permits during the in-
terim program, the operations authorized by the permits were re-
quired to meet federal interim performance standards.359 
For regulation of private activity to withstand Tenth Amendment 
scrutiny, the states must be given the option of avoiding the federal 
regulatory program and policy choices offered under the Commerce 
Clause.36o Under the Surface Mining Act, states could choose to regu-
late according to federal standards or choose not to regulate, in which 
356 [d. at 286 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964». 
357 [d. at 268. 
358 [d. at 270. 
359 [d. 
360 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-76 (1992). Relying upon National League of 
Cities v. Usery, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia found that 
the Surface Mining Act was in violation of the Tenth Amendment because it interfered with the 
"traditional governmental function" of regulating land-use and impermissibly constricted the 
state's ability to make "essential decisions." Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 284-85 (citing 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 833 (1976». The District Court found "the Act 
accomplished this result through forced relinquishment of state control of land-use planning; 
through loss of state control of its economy; and through economic harm, from expenditure of 
state funds to implement the act and from destruction of the taxing power of certain counties, 
cities, and towns." [d. Because the Surface Mining Act regulated the conduct of private persons 
and businesses and did not present a case of state sovereign immunity, the United States 
Supreme Court correctly found the rationale of National League of Cities to be inapplicable. 
Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 287-88. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), as 
well as Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985), which overruled 
it, were cases in which Congress sought to subject a state government to generally applicable 
laws. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160. The issue in Garcia was a question of state sovereignty 
under the Tenth Amendment as that provision limits congressional authority. Garcia, 469 U.S. 
at 537. The Court in New York did not revisit the holdings of Garcia or National League of 
Cities in that regard. New York, 505 U.S. at 155-59. Garcia overruled National League of Cities, 
finding that provisions in the FLSA did not contravene the Commerce Clause or the Tenth 
Amendment. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547. The FLSA conditions under review in Garcia, requiring 
states to pay overtime wages to state employees were, however, conditions imposed under 
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case the federal government would assume the burden and the cost 
of regulating.361 Unlike the take-title provisions struck down in New 
York v. United States, there was no commandeering of the states' 
legislative process in Hodel v. Victoria Surface Mining.362 
Even when a federal regulation has preempted state property laws, 
the regulation is valid in most cases by operation of the Supremacy 
Clause. In Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission, the United 
States Supreme Court reviewed congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause to adopt amendments to the National Trails Sys-
tem Act (Trails Act) that would have the effect of cutting off or 
delaying a landowner's reversionary interest in property pursuant to 
easements initially acquired for railroad rights-of-way.363 Under the 
rationality standard of review the Court upheld the Act.364 Although 
proposed Section 104(k) would not preempt explicitly state property 
laws, it does so implicitly by writing into the Superfund law how the 
property interest is to be construed.365 At Section 104(k)(3), the bill 
provides that: 
A hazardous substance easement shall be enforceable for 20 years 
and may be renewed for additiona120-year periods (unless termi-
nated and released as provided for in this section) against any 
owner of the affected property and all persons who subsequently 
Congress's spending power, not its regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause. [d. at 
554-55. 
861 New York, 505 U.S. at 168. The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia had tried to make out a case of coercion, finding that the choice of a state to have its 
own regulatory program was not a choice at all because the state program must comply with 
federally prescribed standards. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 285 n.25. Unpersuaded, 
the United States Supreme Court found that the Surface Mining Act established a program of 
cooperative federalism that allowed the States to enact and administer their own regulatory 
programs within the limits of federal minimum standards. [d. at 289. The States were not 
compelled to enforce the federal standards, to expend any state funds, or to participate in the 
federal regulatory program in any manner. [d. at 288. If they chose not to implement a regula-
tory program that complied with the Act, then the full regulatory burden would be borne by 
the federal government. [d. 
362 Compare Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 288 with New York, 505 U.S. at 187. 
363 Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 19 (1990). 
364 [d. (deferring to congressional findings "given the long tradition of congressional regulation 
of railroad abandonments"). Although the federal law was preemptive, the fee holders could 
seek compensation in the claims court for the additional property interest taken. 
365 R.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. Section 104(k)(3) (1995). Federal law can preempt state 
law if (a) federal law explicitly preempts state law, (b) the federal law is sufficiently comprehen-
sive to infer that Congress left no room for supplemental state regulation, or (c) state law 
actually conflicts with the federal law so that the state law will be preempted to the extent of 
the actual conflict. Rodas, supra note 223, at 1590 (citing International Paper Co. v. Oullette, 
479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987)). 
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acquire interest in the property or rights to use the property, 
including lessees, licensees, and any other person with an interest 
in the property, without respect to privity or lack of privity of 
estate or contract, lack of benefit running to any other property, 
assignment of the easement to another party, or any other circum-
stance which might otherwise affect the enforceability of ease-
ments or similar deed restrictions under the laws of the state. The 
easement shall be binding upon holders of any other interests in 
the property regardless of whether such interests are recorded 
or whether they were recorded prior or subsequent to the ease-
ment, and shall remain in effect notwithstanding any foreclosure 
or other assertion of such interests.366 
The creation of a federal interest is not unprecedented. Federal 
easements have been defined in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act367 and 
in the Forest Legacy Programs of the 1990 Farm bill.368 This was 
partly in response to lawsuits seeking to defeat federal easements 
with state property law.369 The state law of servitudes has evolved 
into a complex layering of doctrines that has become so confused and 
complex even state courts have refused to enforce it.370 The Uniform 
366 H.R. 2500, Section 104(k)(3). 
367 16 U.S.C. § 1286(c) (1994) (defining scenic easement as "right to control the use of land 
(including the air space above such land) for the purpose of protecting the natural qualities ... 
[of a designated river],,); Snow, supra note 162, at 3. 
368 Snow, supra note 162, at 3 (discussing conservation easements created under Forest 
Legacy Program). 
369 See United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906, 911 (1974) (holding that application of state 
law prohibiting easements in gross could not defeat federal easement). 
370 Because of various policy concerns, state courts have refused to enforce many of these 
common law arrangements, borrowing doctrines from other sources of law. See Susan F. French, 
Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation Doctrines and Structural 
Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 928, 928-29 (1988). At common law, courts have not 
permitted servitudes that imposed affirmative burdens or that created benefits in gross. ld. at 
929. The doctrine of changed conditions operates to terminate a real covenant or equitable 
servitude when changed conditions in or around the burdened land frustrated the purpose of 
the restriction or created an undue hardship on the owner. Blackie, supra note 139, at 1188. A 
number of states have enacted marketable title acts which provide that after a certain number 
of years, generally 20 or 30, claims to or restrictions on real property are automatically extin-
guished. JANET DIEHL & THOMAS S. BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 
132 (1988); see, e.g., Presbytery of S.E. Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232, 242 (Iowa 1975) (holding 
that Iowa marketable title act did not unconstitutionally deprive holder of vested right in that 
it did not alter right but rather conditionally limited time for enforcement of right). Conserva-
tion easements mayor may not be exempted under a particular state law from the operation 
of the act. Presbytery of S.E. lawa, 226 N.W.2d at 239-40 (stating that Massachusetts and 
Wisconsin statutes exempt conservation easements). At least one court has applied the law of 
contracts to construe a restrictive covenant. In Streets v. JM Land & Developing Co., the 
Supreme Court of Wyoming recently applied the law of contracts to uphold a restrictive 
covenant against a purchaser with notice. See 898 P.2d 377, 377--81 (Wyo. 1995). 
1997] LAND USE REGULATION EASEMENTS 331 
Conservation Easements Act (UCEA), after which Section 104(k) and 
many state conservation easement statutes are modeled, sought to 
avoid problems associated with the common law of servitudes.371 Also 
recognizing the problems of the common law (as well as notice stat-
utes that made some provisions obsolete), the draft Restatement (3d) 
of Property defines a new law of servitudes which unifies "the here-
tofore separate bodies of law governing easements, profits, irrevoca-
ble licenses, equitable servitudes, and real covenants."372 It is and will 
remain a state law choice to adopt all or part of the UCEA as well as 
the Restatement of Servitudes. 
A federal grant of jurisdiction over suits brought by the United 
States does not require that federal law be applied.373 In most real 
property transactions, the federal government will follow the prop-
erty law of the state.374 This is the case when property is acquired 
under the authority of Section 104(j). However, when deciding a choice 
of law question under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, the 
Supreme Court held that state laws which are hostile to federal 
interests will not be applied.375 As long as landowners are willing to 
negotiate such agreements, the agreements may not be abrogated by 
state law.376 Therefore, when there is an actual conflict with a federal 
law over the same activity, federal law is supreme.377 State law is not 
without consideration, however. First, when a regulatory regime does 
371 See Blackie, supra note 139, at 1198-1200. Thus, like a conveyance under the Uniform 
Conservation Easements Act (UCEA), a hazardous substance easement under Section 104(k) 
would be valid "even though it is not appurtenant, is assignable, is not traditionally recognized 
at common law, imposes a negative burden, does not touch or concern real property, and is 
without privity of estate or contract." Despite the effort to promote uniformity, state statutes 
authorizing easements for conservation or preservation purposes are diverse. Jordan, supra 
note 5, at 408. These statutes vary considerably in how the easements are created, and in the 
easements' authorized purposes, qualified holders, acceptance, duration, enforcement, modifica-
tion, and termination. [d. at 409. 
372 French, supra note 140, at 119. The RESTATEMENT replaces the common law doctrines 
with three discrete inquiries: creation, validity, and termination and enforcement. [d. at 125. 
373 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973). 
374 Snow, supra note 162, at 3. 
375 Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 597. See also North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 
318-19 (1983). 
376 North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 319 (noting that United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 93 (1950) 
was not to the contrary). In Burnison, the Court upheld a state law prohibiting a testamentary 
transfer of property to the United States, but specifically stated that the holding did not affect 
the right of the United States to acquire property by purchase or eminent domain in the face 
ofa prohibitory statute of the state. North Dakota, 460 U.S. 319 n.22 (citing Burnison, 339 U.S. 
at 93 n.14). 
377 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See, e.g., Trustees of the Diocese v. State, 496 A.2d 151, 153 (Vt. 
1985). 
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preempt state law interests, the regulation may effect a taking requir-
ing compensation.378 Further, even when the federal action preempts 
"the operation and effect of certain state laws, those actions do not 
displace state law as the traditional source of the real property inter-
ests."379 
Both Section 104(j) and Section 104(k) are preemptive to the extent 
of a legitimate federal interest and could not be defeated by a hostile 
state law. At issue, then, is not whether the federal law should be 
upheld against contrary state laws when there is a conflict, but whether 
a new property interest can and should be created under federal law. 
As we have seen, the broad public purpose of Section 104(k) is not 
contractual in nature but regulatory. Nor is it incidental to Super-
fund's environmental purposes. This distinguishes the rationale of 
North Dakota v. United States and the voluntary agreements the 
Court reviewed therein.380 EPA would be allowed to acquire more 
than simply an interest in property, as under Section 104(j). The 
easements created pursuant to the authority of Section 104(k) would 
have the coercive effect of displacing state and local authority over 
land-use regulation altogether. The Tenth Amendment should apply 
to limit the Article I power in this case because Section 104(k) invades 
an incident of state sovereignty. 
D. Unconstitutional Conditions 
Even when there is clear authority to acquire easements, that 
authority may be used in an unconstitutional manner. The facial con-
378 Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1,22 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(conclusion that federal agency power to preempt conflicting state regulation is also power to 
preempt rights guaranteed by state property law would be incompatible with Fifth Amend-
ment); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984). 
379 Preseault, 494 U.S. at 22 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For example, in Formanek v. United 
States, the United States Claims Court found that the Army Corps of Engineer's denial of a 
permit to discharge fill on the landowner's property was a compensable regulatory taking which 
interfered with the investment-backed expectations of the property owners. 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 
335--40 (1992). The Department of Natural Resources had previously offered to buy the property 
which contained several acres of wetlands containing calcareous fen, but negotiations ceased 
when the parties could not agree on its value. Id. at 334. The Corps subsequently sought to 
prohibit development on the land through its discretionary authority to override the nationwide 
permit requirement. Id. The court recognized the legitimate state interest in denying the permit 
application. Id. The court also determined that the development would have been allowed under 
local zoning and land-use procedures. Id. at 337. Denial of the permit was thus a taking requiring 
just compensation. Id. at 332; see also Loveladies Harbor Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 
1183 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (denial of Corps of Engineers permit to allow construction on wetlands 
was regulatory taking because restriction was not supported by state nuisance law). 
380 See supra notes 375-76 and accompanying text. 
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stitutionality of Section 104(k), if otherwise valid, may thus be uncon-
stitutional if the provision would impose conditions on the exercise of 
a constitutional right. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, explicitly recog-
nized the current viability of the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions in Dolan v. City of Tigard.381 When an agency would make the 
exercise of a constitutional right contingent on observance of a condi-
tion, the condition must withstand strict scrutiny, evaluated using a 
two-part test.382 First, the condition must have an essential nexus to 
the legitimate public purpose to be served.383 Second, the condition 
must be roughly proportional to that purpose, in both nature and 
degree.384 This test recognizes that the greater power to prohibit 
necessarily includes the lesser power to condition.385 
The Court's statement of the doctrine in Dolan is that "the govern-
ment may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-[in 
that case] the right to receive just compensation when property is 
taken for a public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit con-
ferred by the government where the property sought has little or no 
relationship to the benefit."386 The doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions would also apply to and protect rights exercised under the First 
and Fourth Amendments, among others.387 The doctrine is not an-
chored in a single provision of the Constitution.388 
There are several general theories of the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine which would analyze "whether a conditioned benefit 
should be unenforceable."389 The conditional benefits view of the doc-
381 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994). 
382 [d. 
383 [d. 
384 [d. at 2318. 
385 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987). 
386 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317 (citing First Amendment cases for statement of doctrine). 
387 See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass'n. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986) 
(when legislature has authority to ban conduct, it can take less intrusive step to allow the 
conduct but reduce its demand through restrictions on advertising). 
388 Gary Feinerman, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Crossroads of Substantive 
Rights and Equal Protection, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1991). 
389 Been, supra note 190, at 484. The five most prominent theories are (1) the extortion theory, 
(2) the coercion theory, (3) the inalienability theory, (4) Kathleen Sullivan's balance of power 
theory, and (5) Richard Epstein's bargaining failure theory. [d. at 486-504. The extortion theory 
holds that "[a]cts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful 
end, and a constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional 
result." [d. at 486. Proponents of the extortion theory generally favor a nexus requirement that 
would allow the unlawful purpose to be identified. See id. A purpose may be unlawful because 
it is either (1) not a legitimate state interest or (2) although legitimate, it is not sufficiently 
related or germane to the purpose which an exercise of the greater power would serve. [d. at 
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trine of unconstitutional conditions is that "government may not grant 
a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitu-
tional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit alto-
gether."390 The conditioned benefits view of the doctrine was first 
applied by the Lochner Court to prohibit conditions on the grant of 
corporate privileges.391 The Warren Court applied the doctrine to 
protect personalliberties.392 This formulation of the doctrine is thus 
intertwined with the protection of substantive due process rights. 
This view is incompatible with the doctrine that the greater power to 
prohibit or deny includes the lesser power to condition.393 Stating the 
theories in terms of conditioned benefits mischaracterizes the debate.394 
486--87. The coercion theory finds a conditional offer is unconstitutional when it has the effect 
of coercing, or improperly obtaining, the surrender of constitutional rights. [d. at 492. The 
coercion theory is the same as the extortion theory provided no other baselines are advanced 
for measuring the result. See id. Professor Kreimer's coercion theory offers three baselines: a 
predictive baseline, an historical baseline, and an equality baseline to distinguish "consent" from 
"coercion." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1415, 1450 
(1989). To employ his theory, it is necessary to distinguish between benefits that enhance and 
those that reduce liberty, which requires value judgments. [d. at 1422-25. Kathleen Sullivan 
would apply the doctrine to two sorts of benefits: (1) exemption from regulation, taxation or 
other burden that could be imposed constitutionally, and (2) direct subsidies or governmental 
distributions of wealth. [d. at 1424. Her balance of power theory is a justification for the 
doctrine's use. An intermediate view of the doctrine is that of Richard Epstein who would apply 
the doctrine using a benefits approach, but only as a "second-best" alternative to check abuses 
in the legislative process. [d. at 1418; Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term 
Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 5, 28 (1988). Because the constitutional defect is based in the process, the conditions 
imposed must be "germane." Epstein defends the doctrine based on a version of the public choice 
theory. Epstein's application of the doctrine requires an economic valuation of the choices. 
Epstein uses a law and economics approach, applying the prisoner's dilemma and various 
bargaining theory models to arrive at an economically efficient decision. See id. 
390 Sullivan, supra note 389, at 1415. Most advocating the use of this theory accept the premise 
that the Constitution does or should protect substantive rights. The debate over the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions thus tends to focus on what rights are being threatened rather 
than their basis in the constitution. To protect the recipients of various substantive government 
benefits, commentators have tried to discredit the greaterllesser power argument. See Brooks 
R. Fudenburg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 371, 371 n.1, 379-80 (1995). 
391 Sullivan, supra note 389, at 1416. 
392 [d. 
393 Kathleen Sullivan's view was that the former view triumphed over the latter. [d. at 1415. 
But that was prior to the Supreme Court's more recent pronouncements to the contrary. 
394 See generally Fudenberg, supra note 390. According to Fudenberg, there are four basic 
positions regarding conditioned benefits: (1) The benefit programs themselves are unconstitu-
tional; (2) the benefit and the condition can each be created, so long as a rational reason exists 
(the basic "greater power" position); (3) the conditions require more than a rational basis (the 
basic "unconstitutional conditions" position); and (4) the ''benefits'' themselves are constitution-
ally mandated. [d. 
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The application of the doctrine is actually a battle over the acceptance 
or not of the greater/lesser power argument.395 The current view 
would not apply to protect conditioned benefits per se. The current 
Court's application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is not 
triggered by the granting of a government benefit at all, but on the 
exercise of a constitutional right.396 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is tied to the potential 
abuse of government power, but it does not require a per se invalida-
tion of all conditional grants.397 Most theories of the doctrine would 
permit the condition if it survives strict scrutiny.398 In land-use cases, 
this requires the two-pronged nexus inquiry applied in Dolan.399 
The exaction found to be unconstitutional in Dolan was a public 
easement to be used for both flood control and a bike path.4°O The 
landowner had applied for a building permit to expand a plumbing 
and electric supply business at an existing location.401 The City Plan-
ning Commission found that the additional paving and footprint of the 
building would create an increase in stormwater runoff into the creek 
behind the property.402 The Commission also found that the expanded 
store would increase traffic and congestion on existing roads.403 The 
Dolan Court agreed that the permit conditions had a sufficient nexus 
to the burdens created by the development (the alleviation of which 
were legitimate public purposes).404 Under the second part of the test, 
however, the Court found that the conditions were not roughly pro-
portional to that purpose.405 There was no rationale to support why a 
private easement would not serve the public purpose of flood control 
as well as a public easement. There was also insufficient justification 
395 [d. Noting that a consistent application of the principle that the greater power includes the 
lesser power seems to negate the benefits along with the conditions. [d. This adds a political 
dimension to the analysis since the powers to provide these benefits are not explicitly listed in 
the Constitution, but are there only because of judicial interpretations. See id. He would actually 
"separate" the greater/lesser powers doctrine from the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. [d. 
396 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316-17 (1994). 
397 Richard A. Epstein, The Legacy of Goldberg v. Kelly: A Twenty Year Perspective: No New 
Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747, 763 (1990). 
398 But see Fudenberg, supra note 390, at 394-95 (stating that greater/lesser power doctrine 
in most cases applies rational basis test). 
399 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317. 
400 [d. 
401 [d. at 2313. 
402 [d. at 2315. 
403 [d. 
404 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317. 
405 [d. at 2319-21. 
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for the bike path. To withstand strict scrutiny, there must be an 
individualized determination that this nexus is met in the requisite 
nature and degree.406 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been applied to test 
the facial constitutionality of a statute as well.407 In Posadas v. Tour-
ism Co., the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that allowed 
restrictions on advertising of casino gambling against a First Amend-
ment challenge.408 The Court reviewed the conditions to determine 
whether they were permissible restrictions on commercial speech.409 
Because of Puerto Rico's substantial interest in reducing casino gam-
bling, Puerto Rico had the power to ban gambling altogether. It was 
therefore permissible for Puerto Rico to take the less intrusive step 
of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions 
on advertising.410 The conditions were thus permissible, having met 
the constitutional standards for regulation of commercial speech. 
As applied to Section l04(k), the question is: if Congress (acting 
through the EPA) has the greater power to acquire the easement 
through purchase or condemnation, can they acquire the easement 
with the condition that the easement preempt state interests and is 
public in nature? It is clear that the federal interest can constitution-
ally preempt state property interests when there is Commerce Clause 
authority.411 Whether there is an essential nexus between the envi-
ronmental purpose of the statute as a whole and the additional condi-
tions of Section 104(k) should be judged under strict scrutiny. On the 
face of the bill, there are conditions providing for citizen suit enforce-
ment of the easement terms;412 the potential for excessive fines;413 and 
406 [d. at 2319. 
407 Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341, 347-48 (1986). 
408 [d. at 347-48. 
409 The Court applied the test from Central Hudson, which allows restrictions on commercial 
speech if the government's interest in doing so is substantial, the restrictions directly advance 
the government's asserted interest, and the restrictions are no more extensive than necessary 
to serve that interest. [d. at 340 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo 
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980». The substantial interest in this case was in protecting 
its residents from excessive casino gambling which would have the harmful effects of disrupting 
moral and cultural patterns, increasing local crime, fostering prostitution, developing corruption 
and allowing infiltration of organized crime. [d. at 341. 
410 [d. at 346. 
411 See supra notes 354-56 and accompanying text. 
412 H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 113 (1995) (proposing amendments to Section 
104(k)(1l». 
413 H.R. 2500, § 113. Relief may be sought through enforcement under Section 106(b)(1) of 
CERCLA, which provides for fines of up to $25,000 per day. [d. 
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the insertion of federal authority over land-use decisions (as opposed 
to moral suasion) that amount to a surrender of dual sovereignty.414 
Assuming that, facially, Section 104(j) would impose conditions re-
lated in nature and degree to the environmental purpose of the stat-
ute, as measured against the jurisdictional requirement that the con-
ditions are "needed to conduct a remedial action,"415 what justification 
would authorize the taking of the additional property interests? It is 
not clear that Congress has considered this aspect of Section 104(k). 
The findings that would have authorized the voluntary state pro-
grams for Brownfields redevelopment in H.R. 2500 are insufficient 
justification to withstand strict scrutiny.416 As noted, it is only the 
stigma associated with the property and not the prospect of actual 
liability that is impeding redevelopment.4!7 The purpose is, therefore, 
unrelated to conditions that would be imposed on the future use of 
the land. 
414 [d. Through the broad public purpose of the statute, the agency could acquire regulatory 
powers rather than simply an interest in land. See supra Section lILA. 
415 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(j)(1) (1994); see supra Section lILA. 
416 H.R.2500, § 301(a): 
[d. 
Sec. 301. State voluntary response programs. 
(a) Findings. Congress finds the following: 
(1) Brownfields are abandoned or underutilized industrial sites that may contain envi-
ronmental contamination, often located in urban and economically distressed areas. 
(2) Brownfields, which may number in the hundreds of thousands nationwide, devalue 
surrounding property, erode local tax bases, and prevent job growth. 
(3) Despite potentially great productive value, prospective developers avoid 
brownfields because of the uncertainty of cleanup and development costs, which leads 
to construction on undeveloped so-called greenfield sites, contributing to urban sprawl, 
creating infrastructure problems, and reducing the amount of open spaces. 
(4) Lenders and fiduciaries hesitate to finance or encourage projects to redevelop 
brownfields because of liability for environmental contamination and the uncertainty 
of cleanup and development costs, and therefore brownfields remain undeveloped and 
the environmental contamination is not quickly addressed. 
(5) Redevelopment and cleanup of brownfields would reduce environmental contami-
nation, encourage job growth, and curb the development of greenfields. 
(6) State voluntary programs to address environmental contamination, and Federal 
liability reforms to encourage lenders and developers to invest in brownfield sites, can 
be very effective in promoting the redevelopment of brownfields. 
(b) Purposes and Objectives. The purposes and objectives of this section are to-
(1) significantly increase the pace of response activities at contaminated sites by 
promoting and encouraging the creation, development, and expansion of state volun-
tary response programs; and 
(2) benefit the public health, welfare, and the environment by returning contaminated 
sites to economically productive or other beneficial uses. 
417 See supra Section II.C. 
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E. Spending Power 
Where Congress is unable to regulate directly, it may condition the 
use of federal funds under the spending power and accomplish indi-
rectly the same end.418 The United States Supreme Court, in South 
Dakota v. Dole, stated four restrictions on the conditions Congress 
may impose. First, the exercise of the spending power must be in 
pursuit of the general welfare.419 Second, the fact that the money is 
conditional must be unambiguous so the states can exercise their 
choice knowingly and with awareness of the consequences.420 Third, 
the conditions must be "related" to the federal interest in particular 
national projects or programs.421 As a fourth condition, "other consti-
tutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional 
grant of federal funds."422 
In Dole, the Court reviewed a federal law that directs the Secretary 
of Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal highway funds 
otherwise allocable from states "in which the purchase or public pos-
session . . . of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than 
twenty-one years of age is lawful."423 The State of South Dakota, 
where the lawful drinking age was 19, challenged the law as a viola-
tion of the spending power and the Twenty-first Amendment.424 The 
case did not require the Court to determine whether Congress had 
the power to legislate a national drinking age directly.425 Because 
Congress had acted indirectly to condition the receipt of federal funds, 
the Court reviewed their exercise of the spending power that gives 
Congress the authority to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and 
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States."426 This power can be used by 
418 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). Under the spending power, Congress 
may spend for the general welfare whether or not those purposes fall within the enumerated 
powers. See Epstein, supra note 389, at 45. 
419 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
420 See id. 
421 See id. 
422 [d. at 208. 
423 [d. at 205. 
424 Dole, 483 U.S. at 205. The "'l\venty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete 
control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor 
distribution system." [d. (citing California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980». 
425 [d. at 206. 
426 See id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). 
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Congress "to further broad policy objectives."427 Congress's authority 
to condition federal spending is thus not limited by its authority under 
the Commerce Clause.428 For this reason, the Tenth Amendment also 
imposes fewer limitations under the spending power than under the 
Commerce Clause.429 
The fourth criterion that may limit the conditional spending power 
of Congress is an independent constitutional bar. As with limitations 
on the police power, this ban generally would arise from the property, 
speech, contract, religion, or equal protection guarantees of the Con-
stitution.430 As phrased by the Court, the spending power may not be 
used to induce the states to engage in activities that would themselves 
be unconstitutional.431 The Twenty-first Amendment did not provide 
such a bar in this case.432 This independent constitutional bar is not "a 
prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress 
is not empowered to achieve directly."433 This fourth criterion de-
mands only that Congress not induce states to do that which would 
otherwise be unconstitutiona1.434 
The third criterion under the conditional spending analysis requires 
that the condition be related to the federal interest.435 This criteria 
checks the exercise of the spending power against the Tenth Amend-
ment.436 Where the conditions are reasonably related to the federal 
interest, there is less concern that the national government will use 
its powers to "control, unduly interfere with, or destroy a State's 
ability to perform essential services."437 Because the Dole Court found 
427Id. at 206 (citing Fullilove v. Kiutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)). 
428Id. at 206--07. 
429 Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)). This is not the case, 
however, if the conditions involve an attempt by Congress to expand its power over those 
interests reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Epstein, supra note 389, at 45-46. 
Congress must then show a compelling interest. Id. at 45. 
430 See Epstein, supra note 389, at 59. Determining whether police power measures are 
appropriate requires an analysis of the fit between the ends to be served and the means to be 
used. The level of scrutiny applied to these decisions is significant to this determination. 
431 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210. 
432Id. at 209. 
433Id. at 210. The Dole Court clearly rejected this formulation of the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions, which is a variation of the conditional benefits view. 
434 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is applied to the fourth prong 
of the conditional spending analysis. 
435Id. at 207-08. 
436 See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 460-67 (1978). 
437Id. (upholding aviation fees against Tenth Amendment challenge and addressing Justice 
Marshall's concern that using taxing power as a regulatory device will unduly burden essential 
state activities, i.e., the power to tax is the power to destroy). 
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that the condition imposed on highway funds was directly related to 
one of the primary purposes for which highway funds are expended-
safe interstate travel-they did not address the "outer bounds" of the 
germaneness requirement.438 To the contrary, the condition that Sec-
tion 104(k) recognize broad societal rights in the property is unrelated 
to Superfund's remediation goals.439 
A key to the constitutionality of financial inducements under the 
spending power, like the inducements offered by Congress under the 
commerce power, is that the states retain a choice. The Tenth Amend-
ment does provide protection when the inducements offered by Con-
gress become so coercive as to exceed the point at which "pressure 
turns into compulsion."44o This would require two showings.441 First, 
that when the inducements are separated from the regulation, the 
regulation is incapable of standing by itself.442. Second, that the two in 
combination are weapons of coercion, destroying or impairing the 
autonomy of the states.443 In Steward Machine v. Davis, the Court 
reviewed certain revenue provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 
against this standard.444 Because the conditions were terms of a stat-
ute which could be altered or repealed, and the state's consent could 
be revoked, the Act did not "call for a surrender by the states of 
powers essential to their quasi-sovereign existence."445 
I t is not clear whether the conditional spending analysis would 
apply to contracts made directly with individuals, or whether federal 
authority to make those contracts is limited to the reach of the com-
4:l8 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09. 
439 See supra Section lILA and the relatedness discussion in Section IV.D. 
440 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
441 Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 586. 
442Id. 
443 ld. 
444 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1994). At issue were title IX, Tax on Employers 
of Eight or More, and title III, Grants to States for Unemployment Compensation Administra-
tion. Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 574. Under the Act, the federal government would collect a 
tax from employers, but would credit 90% of the tax if the states administered an unemployment 
compensation plan that met certain conditions of the Act. ld. at 574-77. The tax was well within 
the powers of the federal government to collect excise taxes. ld. at 578-83. In finding the excise 
not void as involving coercion of the states in contravention of the Tenth Amendment, they 
distinguished duress from inducement and, in particular, the decision a year earlier in Butler. 
ld. at 586-87 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,65, 66 (1936)). Most importantly, the 
condition in the Social Security Act was not linked to an irrevocable agreement; at any time the 
state could repeal its unemployment law, terminate the credit, and place itself where it was 
before the credit was accepted. ld. at 592-93. 
445 Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 593. The Court, however, did not believe the result would 
be different if the conditions were imposed by contract rather than by statute. ld. at 597. 
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merce power.446 In New York v. United States, the Court differentiated 
the commerce and spending powers by stating that: "Congress regu-
lates private activity pursuant to its authority under the Commerce 
Clause ... [and w]here the recipient of federal funds is a State ... 
the conditions attached to the funds by Congress may influence a 
State's legislative choices."447 
In United States v. Butler, the Court first articulated the distinc-
tions between the spending power and the power to regulate under 
the Commerce Clause. The Butler court struck down an emergency 
act regulating agricultural production that allowed the federal gov-
ernment to enter into agreements with farmers to reduce acreage or 
production of certain crops.448 There was no question in the Court's 
mind that the Act was beyond the reach of the commerce power since 
the control of agricultural production was a purely local activity; this 
fact, however, was irrelevant to the decision.449 The Court adopted the 
Hamiltonian view that the power to spend for the general welfare was 
separate and distinct from the enumerated powers given to Con-
gress.450 
The Court nonetheless found that the Act was not a valid exercise 
of the spending power.451 According to the opinion, the Butler decision 
did not rest on a conditional appropriation of money under the spend-
ing clause.452 Rather, the Court found that the Act invaded the powers 
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. The Court found no 
difference between Congress compelling the state to regulate the 
local affairs of the state's citizens and Congress making a contract 
446 If the spending power cannot be used to purchase the power to regulate otherwise state 
or local affairs, and the Tenth Amendment's limitation on Congress's regulatory powers is a 
mirror image of its commerce power, then it would seem that the federal government could not 
contract with individuals (as opposed to condition grants to the states) in a way that would 
exceed their powers to regulate under the Commerce Clause. 
447 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (emphasis added). 
448 Butler, 297 U.S. at 1. The Agricultural Adjustment Act was considered outside the com-
merce power; however, similar subsidies are now allowed under the Conservation Reserve 
Program now believed to be within the commerce power. 
449 I d. at 64. 
450 ld. at 65-66. 
4511d. 
452Id. at 73. "There is an obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions upon 
which moneys shall be expended and one effective only upon assumption of a contractual 
obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be enforced." ld.; see also South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that Butler Court 
saw Agricultural Adjustment Act for what it was-an exercise of regulatory, not spending, 
power). 
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relating to their conduct.453 The Court reasoned that, since the United 
States can make a contract only if the federal power to tax and 
appropriate reaches the subject-matter of the contract, when such a 
contract does reach the subject-matter, the state by virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause is without power to declare the contract void.454 
Butler has been the only Supreme Court case finding an exercise 
of the spending power beyond the presumptive powers of Congress.455 
It was distinguished in Steward Machine based on the coerciveness 
of the condition.456 We know from the decision in Dole that conditions 
on the exercise of the spending power may be so coercive as to require 
a surrender of state sovereignty, akin to compelling state regulation 
directly.457 In this case, Congress would regulate by purchasing inter-
ests in land. This regulation, as in Butler, is not conditional spend-
ing.458 It is a commandeering of the state legislative process. 
Congress does invoke its spending power to encourage state par-
ticipation in CERCLA cleanups. Superfund does not preempt state 
liability or a state cleanup.459 It does encourage state participation in 
implementing a remedial action, giving the states a choice to accept 
federal funding for state-led responses.460 But consider as well the use 
of institutional controls with EPA's Brownfields Initiative. The states 
have a choice to participate with EPA through SMOAs or voluntary 
state programs that essentially invite EPA to use their CERCLA 
authority in redevelopment.461 Through this process, however, the 
states may not consent to additional conditions that are beyond the 
commerce and spending powers of Congress.462 
453 Butler, 297 U.S. at 74. 
454 [d. 
455 See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 1103, 1126 (1987). 
456 [d. at 1139. 
457 Dole, 483 U.S. at 209--10. 
458 See Butler, 297 U.S. at 70. 
459 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1994). 
460 40 C.F.R. § 300.500(b) (1995). There may be two types of state-led response actions: (1) 
state-led, fund-financed, or (2) state-led, non-fund-financed. [d. § 300.515. Under the first type, 
the state is required to enter into a cooperative agreement with the EPA to receive fund 
financing. [d. § 300.515(a). EPA retains final approval and must concur in and adopt the ROD. 
[d. § 300.515(e). In a state-led, non-fund-financed cleanup, the state is not required to get EPA 
approval of the remedy but also may not invoke CERCLA authority, thus leaving the states 
exposed to the possibility that EPA will later take actions that are different from those selected 
under the state-led cleanup. [d. § 300.515(e)(2)(ii); see also Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1540 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993). 
461 See supra Section II.C. 
462 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992). 
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CONCLUSION 
In New York v. United States, the Court looked at the expanded 
federal role under the commerce and spending powers, and the sig-
nificance of the Supremacy Clause when there is an actual conflict, to 
determine the balance between state and federal powers in that case. 
The Court emphasized that, although "[t]he actual scope of the Fed-
eral Government's authority with respect to the States has changed 
over the years, ... the constitutional structure underlying and limit-
ing that authority has not."463 This rationale supported their decision 
to invalidate a statutory provision that was contrary to the federal 
structure protected by the Tenth Amendment even though the pro-
vision had been proposed by the states' governors. Because the fun-
damental purpose served by the federal structure is to protect indi-
viduals, state officials may not consent: 
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for 
the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political 
entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing 
the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority 
between federal and state governments for the protection of in-
dividuals.464 
In the case of hazardous substance easements, the fact that the states 
have consented through cooperative agreements or SMOAs is also of 
no import.465 
The Tenth Amendment is also important in preserving a land ethic. 
Some may be overly devoted to the idea that the federal government 
is more sensitive to environmental concerns and would be a superior 
steward of the land. There is direct evidence to the contrary provided 
by simply looking at the environmental record at federal facilities, 
which is poor.466 Because of the United States Department of Justice 
(DOJ) "unitary executive policY,"467 EPA has been unable to address 
effectively the pollution problems at federal facilities. It is the Tenth 
Amendment and state sovereignty that has been the most effective 
463 [d. at 159. 
464 [d. at 181. 
465 See supra Section IY.E. 
466 Babich, supra note 100, at 1522. "The most dangerous hazardous waste sites in the United 
States generally are those that the federal government created itself." [d. Babich offers the 
further view that, in practice, state governments are as capable as federal agencies and more 
responsive. [d. 
467 This policy is based on the premise that all agencies of the federal government work for 
the same sovereign; therefore, EPA cannot sue itself. 
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response to the federal government's inability to deal with polluted 
federal facilities.468 Therefore, in United States v. Colorado,469 Colo-
rado was not barred from enforcing state law at a federal facility within 
the state even though there was an ongoing CERCLA cleanup.470 
It is alarming how casually we are abandoning our idea of self-gov-
ernment. By constitutional design, when we own property in the 
United States, we exercise rights of ownership within the limitations 
of the law, including laws protecting the health and safety of our 
neighbors. Likewise, we exercise rights as citizens when we bring a 
lawsuit to restrain another's wrongful use of their property or to 
recover damages for injuries caused by others' actions. Through this 
system, our idea of wrongful use can change over time, and the commu-
nity standards are reflected through the jury system, the availability 
of common law remedies, and through our choice of elected repre-
sentatives.471 When, however, we delegate all decisions to bodies of 
experts or representatives, the property owner (or operator) is no 
longer required to exercise the same degree of self-restraint or judg-
ment. And the decisionmaker has no vested interest in the outcome, 
especially when the decision-maker is not a member of the community. 
This is totalitarian in design. It was also not what Aldo Leopold 
intended. It is ironic that we want to remove local primacy in land-use 
planning in the name of assuring community participation. 
The purported purpose of federal involvement in the Brownfields 
Initiative is to provide technical assistance to the states and federal 
"liability reform."472 As discussed, however, most Brownfields sites 
are not actually subject to Superfund liability. The legislative reform 
would provide a federal role, replacing the stigma with actual juris-
diction. Further, Congress is aware of other means to remove the 
468 Babich, supra note 100, at 1544. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), S. 
1, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), was, however, an "isolated misstep ... , an unfortunate by-prod-
uct of an essentially healthy tension between sovereigns." Babich, supra note 100, at 1549. The 
UMRA is not about federal mandates to states to implement federal regulations without 
adequate funding (distinguished from incentives)-this coercive action was not allowed before 
the Act. See supra Section IV.A; see also Babich, supra note 100, at 1547-48. The UMRA 
adopted a lesser federal standard for governments than applies to private facilities. Id. at 
1546-47. 
469 United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1565 (lOth Cir. 1993). 
470 Id. The United States had argued that the states' role was confined to the ARAR's process. 
The court determined that, because Colorado had been delegated independent RCRA authority, 
they were not limited to that mechanism. Id. at 158l. 
471 Note the renewed use of common law rights of action to recover for pollution damages. 
472 See supra note 398. 
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threat of Superfund liability from innocent landowners, lenders and 
purchasers without adding conditions to a site-by-site covenant not 
to sue by EPA that assures federal involvement rather than non-in-
volvement.473 The opposite effect is as likely. EPA's continued involve-
ment at the site and the threat of civil fines that would accompany a 
Section 104(k) interest may actually discourage the private sector 
from developing these properties. Congress is also aware of valid 
means of encouraging land-use planning by the states if there is a 
specific need not being met.474 Section 104(k) is not necessary to the 
Brownfields Initiative. 
Section 104(k) is also not related to Superfund's remediation goals. 
Under Section 104(j), EPA is allowed to acquire an interest in land. 
Under Section 104(k), EPA would acquire the right to regulate land-
use with respect to the land. It is a coercive spending scheme which 
invades the sovereignty of the states. Section 104(k) violates the 
Commerce Clause because it is not incidental to CERCLA's environ-
mental purposes and it contains no jurisdictional element to allow 
review of EPA's property acquisitions on a case-by-case basis. Fur-
ther, its preemptive effect in replacing state and local land-use plan-
ning with federal regulation is an invasion of powers reserved to the 
states under the Tenth Amendment. 
Congress has no authority to engage in local land-use planning 
under its commerce or spending powers. There is thus no public 
purpose to justify its exercise of eminent domain. The offer to pay 
compensation, as well as the covenant not to sue in a Brownfields 
redevelopment, is a false choice. Even if Congress does have the 
greater power to regulate for this purpose, the conditions offered on 
the exercise of the power could not survive strict scrutiny. Section 
104(k) is not only unwise, it is unconstitutional. 
473 See supra Section II.C. 
474 See discussion of CZMA, supra Section III.C. 
